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While migration has been widely conceptualised as a socio-cultural phenomenon in 
Sociology and the social sciences, lesser attention has been given to the perspectives 
of business or industry growth. Yet, given the prevalent labour flows today, coupled 
with the prevailing demand for migrant labour across the skill spectrum, migration is 
increasingly a business-oriented activity. Using the case of new Chinese immigrants 
in Singapore, this thesis examines the changing social organisation of immigration 
and its implications for various institutions. The basic argument is that the uniquely 
‘new’ characteristic of immigration today lies in the ways it has been 
institutionalised – through businesses and government policies. However, I am not 
suggesting that there is solely a change from the use of personal networks to formal 
organisations in the migration process; rather, there are elements of personal ties and 
informal networks which have persisted or emerged in new forms. Overall, this 
institutionalisation of migration results in the growing influence of the migration 
industry. This phenomenon has a three-fold significance. First, while Chinese 
migration is anything but new, I make a case for a new diversity amongst Chinese 
immigrants. New immigrants today are more varied in terms of backgrounds, skills 
and orientations, thus causing heightened diversity in Chinese immigration. This 
departs from older migrant groups. I also argue that migration today has taken on a 
more business-oriented and corporate character; it is heavily reliant on institutions 
rather than the conventional means of personal/familial ties. Second, this new 
diversity exists as older patterns of the social organisation of Chinese migration are 
being disrupted and new modes of immigration proliferate. Specifically, amongst 
Chinese immigrants, there is an increase in the dependence on institutionalised 




this reliance on institutionalised networks fuels the migration industry in Singapore. 
Through the problematization of ‘new immigration’, ‘migration networks’ and the 
‘migration industry, this thesis examines the social and economic dynamics of new 
immigration. Overall, these developments are significant as they questions previous 
understandings of Chinese migration, networks and migrant social organisation. 
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Public and academic discourses today are replete with the terms ‘new 
Chinese immigration’ and ‘new Chinese immigrants’ (Oon 2012; Chiang 2012; 
Khoo 2012). Yet, Chinese immigration is anything but new. What is new, however, 
are the ways in which immigration has been institutionalised – mainly through 
businesses and government policies as seen in the rise of the migration industry and 
migration-related institutions. In this thesis, I examine these new dimensions of 
Chinese immigration to Singapore. Firstly, I reason that this highly organised and 
formal arrangement today lies in the changing configurations of migration networks. 
While migration networks in the past were often undergirded by kinship and personal 
ties, networks today are more diverse and have as their social bases, relations more 
diverse than kinship ties. Some examples of the bases of migration networks include 
formal business transactions and alumni associations, which rely on a diversity of 
networks to sustain themselves. Consequently and secondly, these changing 
configurations of networks have paved the way for institutions to react to them by 
either facilitating or capitalising on immigration flows. These network dynamics 
make immigration ‘new’ insofar as the organisation of immigration today sees a 
departure from older patterns of organisation and concomitantly, the formation of 
new ones. Here, I use the case of new Chinese immigrants in Singapore to 
demonstrate the new social organisation of immigration and show how it drives the 
rise of the migration industry. Overall, these developments are significant because 
they constitute in and of themselves, migration-induced ‘social change’ (Van Hear 




specifically, these changes provide insights on changing migration processes which 
this thesis will unpack.  
1.1 Research Problem  
This thesis examines three issues: new immigration, networks and the 
migration industry. To understand how new immigration brings about a migration 
industry, yet without ignoring migrant experiences, I draw on the concept of 
networks. Networks serve as a tool to bridge the specific and broad level operations 
of immigration (Figure 1). This research thus pursues three lines inquiries: a) what is 
new about Chinese immigration today?, b) how different is the social organisation of 
Chinese immigration today? and lastly, c) what constitutes the migration industry 
and why is it gaining importance today? 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework 
First, I problematize the ‘new’ traits of Chinese migration. I argue that Chinese 
immigration is anything but new, both internationally and locally. On an 
international level, there exists works on ‘new Chinese immigrants’ such as Japan 
(Le Bail 2005), South Africa (Huynh and Park 2011), Canada (Guo and Devoretz 




Locally, ‘new Chinese immigration’ is somewhat oxymoronic as the inflow of 
Chinese immigrants has existed from the beginning of Singapore’s history, an 
immigrant society. Yet, despite being an old trend, current Chinese immigration 
exhibits discontinuities from the past. While immigration from The People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) is an old pattern, it has of late been occurring at 
unprecedented rates and is thus indicative of a new migration context.  
Logically, what follows is the presence of new mechanisms undergirding 
migration processes. Since networks are used to explain the mechanism behind the 
‘self-perpetuating’ migration processes (Massey 1986: 60), it stands as a useful 
concept to explain the mechanisms of change, which this thesis deals with through its 
focus on new migratory patterns. Specifically, I explore the new dimensions of 
migration networks and argue that migration networks are operating differently 
today, mainly because of the ways in which they have evolved. This argument is 
driven by a conceptual puzzle: given the diversity of Chinese immigrants today, the 
social bases of migration networks are evidently expanding, thus causing migration 
networks to become more institutionalised. Moreover, to some degree, migration 
networks today are also increasingly commercial in nature. These realties stand in 
contrast to previous understandings of Chinese networks which are centred on 
notions of deep and personal relations. Those networks were described to be 
particularly instrumental to business opportunities (Tong and Yong 1998; Rauch and 
Trindad 2002). Tong and Yong (1998) refer to this as ‘personalism’, which they 
suggest have three aspects: personal control, Guanxi (personal relations) and Xinyong 
(trust). In essence, the lack of trust or the desire for personal control leads to the 




depends on personal relations anchored in locality/dialect, kinship ties, workplace 
ties, social clubs and friendships.  
Given that traditional models of Chinese networks are anchored in close 
personal ties, how and why are networks today more institutionalised and 
commercialised? I argue that the discontinuity between old and emerging models of 
Chinese migration networks is caused by a decreasing usage of personal networks. I 
stress that the role of networks has not vanished but has instead changed in form: 
new immigrants have become more dependent on formal and institutionalised 
networks, while still being dependent on personal networks in either old or new 
forms. I reason that current networks are increasingly rooted in organisations which 
range from legal services to recruitment, settlement services and even government-
linked services. One driver of this could be that the strength of personal networks to 
the community has become weaker and more loosely organised than it was in the 
past. According to Johnston (1971: 20-23), more ‘loosely organised’ links heighten 
the tendency for people to migrate. The lack of personal networks is therefore, not a 
deterrent to migrate. Since this is so, what tools do immigrants rely on when 
considering migration?  
Taken together, I argue that these new network dynamics are increasingly 
facilitators of new migration patterns. New networks, I argue, are organised around 
various institutions and organisations rather than personal relations. The 
organisations leverage on this new population of immigrants (networks) as potential 
clients. As a result, there is a proliferation of migration-related institutions and a 
steady growth of the ‘migration industry’. This ‘industry’ I argue consists of an 




while others are only emerging. I relate the idea of network changes to the growing 
migration industry by asking these questions: who are the actors in this industry and 
how are immigrants reliant on them? In addition, how has migration become 
institutionalised, either in the form of businesses or government policies? Although I 
stress the emergence of institutionalised migration networks, I am in no way 
dismissing the importance of personal migration networks; I argue that these 
networks work in tandem with each other.  
 
1.2 Outline of the Chapters 
In chapter two, I discuss the conceptual basis of this thesis. By combining the 
ideas of institutions and network, I wish to understand the broader institutional 
outcomes arising from the changes in migration processes. This chapter also includes 
the methodology. Chapters three and four contain secondary data. In chapter three, I 
present a historical overview of Chinese migration with the objective of highlighting 
the enduring traits/patterns of migration over the years. This sets the stage for chapter 
four, which is a documentation of new Chinese immigrants. The objective here is to 
understand the profiles of these immigrants and the new context in which they 
migrate in. I show that new Chinese immigration -post 1978- is common in many 
parts of the world and also include some empirical data from respondents from 
Singapore. Chapters five and six contain primary data. Moving beyond immigrant 
profiling and descriptions, chapter five proposes that the uniquely ‘new’ aspect of 
Chinese immigration today is its changing social organisation: instead of being 
predominantly rooted in personal relations, Chinese migration is increasingly 




dynamics or what I term the ‘new network dynamics’. This new mechanism causes a 
departure from kinship-oriented nature of Chinese immigration. In its place is a 
system of institutionalised migration. However, I maintain that personal networks are 
still being used, but in a form different from the past. Personal networks and 
institutional networks are not mutually exclusive. Broadly speaking, these 
institutionalised migration networks are organised as migration-related institutions. 
Therefore, in chapter six, I build on the idea of the migration industry. I review 
literature and present suggestions on how to conceptualise the migration industry.  
Finally, in chapter seven, I conclude by showing how the problematization of ‘new’ 
immigration leads to an analysis which brings together networks and institutions. 
The results of combining these two perspectives are threefold: firstly, the recognition 
of a changing social organisation of migration, secondly, the unsettling of the 
assumption that migration networks are often based on kinship ties and finally, the 





CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter reviews the general theories of migration and suggests that 
emphasis is usually on either the structural aspects or agentive features of migration. 
The weakness of this tendency is the presentation of somewhat polarised ideas of 
migration. In this chapter, I suggest that while network and institutional perspectives 
have been individually established in migration studies, scant attention is given to the 
integration of these perspectives. This integration is particularly useful to my 
research agenda of understanding how changes in migrant network dynamics impact 
the development and growing importance of the migration industry. I expound on 
this argument by suggesting the utility of combining these perspectives. First, it 
provides a frame through which to examine new Chinese migration vis-à-vis old 
Chinese migration. This highlights the discontinuity between old and new Chinese 
migration. Second, the interactions between networks and institutions shed light on a 
new organisation of Chinese migration - one that is more dependent on the migration 
industry and less on personal networks. Third, exploring the emergence of the 
migration industry emphasizes the linkages between the economic and social aspects 
of migration. Each of these arguments is taken up in Chapters three, four and five 
respectively. In addition, the methodology will also be discussed.   
2.1 Contextualising Migration: Transnationalism 
In recent years, transnationalism has become a popular lens through which 
researchers examine migration. This perspective captures the back-and-forth 
dynamics of migratory processes, thus serving as a more fluid approach to 




known as “processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social 
relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement” Basch, Glick 
Schiller and Szanton Blanc (1994:8) became a buzzword in the literature. 
Transnational migration networks serve to explain the globalised economy and its 
reliance on the recruitment, placement and circulation of labour (Vertovec 2002). 
This thesis does not seek to debate the various strands of transnationalism 
theories, but rather, but rather, accepts that migration processes occur within  
transnational environments. As such, I am aware that networks and institutions, 
which will be discussed later, have a transnational dimension. Since migrants’ 
relationships with their families, states and employers are increasingly wide-ranging 
and less anchored in solitary units, institutions become critical for they serve to 
consolidate various types of networks.  In what follows, I review network 
perspectives and complement them with institutional perspectives to explain new 
Chinese migration.  
 
2.2 Network Perspectives: Opportunities and Social Origins of Migration  
Networks cross-cut many aspects of social life; its reach ranges from 
individual interactions to groups organizational dynamics and thus makes the 
concept a very wide-ranging one. This however, does not compromise on its 
incisiveness. So how are networks related to migration? Networks are information 
channels through which opportunities arise. Most significant is the work of 
Granovetter (1985) which highlights the benefits of various types of networks. His 
concept of “the strength of weak ties” argues that actors tend to get non-redundant or 




one can get useful job information in an alumni meeting from the person that one is 
only marginally acquainted. This network is formed via alumni ties rather than 
through close friendships. Such weak ties become important in modern society as the 
network density, or the extent to which people know each other, is lower than in 
traditional society.   
Social networks are also the social origins of migration (Tilly and Brown 
1967; Massey 1990; Massey, Alarcón, J. Durand, and H. González 1987). Networks 
are useful for examining migration processes such as recruitment and settlement. 
They focus on actors who negotiate various network structures. In migration, they 
are personal ties which galvanises many migrants through a sense of community. As 
the first line of support to tap on, social networks serve as convenient resources for 
an immigrant in a new country. In addition, networks are also strategic resources for 
‘risk diversification’ because when migrants have an extensive web of networks, the 
risk of emigration declines, thus resulting in more immediate potential gains being 
realised. Social networks are usually discussed in light of personal networks and 
family migration (Maseey 1986; Powell and Smith-Doerr 1994).  
In the case of Mexican immigration to the US for example, networks, 
especially kinship ties drive immigration. Familial ties consist of a high degree of 
trust, and serve as the immigrants’ “most secure” connections (Massey 1986: 104). 
As a result, many immigrants rely on these ties to gain access and then employment 
in the US. The inherent reciprocity in familial ties ensures these migration networks 
to be self-sustaining. Echoing Massey’s argument that family ties are the social bases 
of migration networks is Herman’s metaphor of ‘migration as a family business’ 




in the mobilisation, mobility and integration stages of migration, and is therefore the 
social basis of such movements. Much like this example, there are other studies on 
Mexican chain migration stating the immigrant reliance on familial networks. This 
type of social support does not only apply to the Mexicans but to communities in 
other countries as well (Grieco 1992). However, recent works acknowledge the need 
to differentiate the strength of migration networks because not all familial networks 
operate the same way as the Mexican ones, nor do all family networks possess the 
same degree of influence (Herman 2006; Curran and Rivero-Fuentes 2003). 
‘Networks’ is clearly a nuanced concept, one with elaborate functions and 
operational mechanisms depending on the circumstances.  
 
The Limits of Social Networks 
Social networks have featured prominently in migration processes and are 
understood to be the fundamental social bases upon which migration is sustained. 
Yet, in this globalised environment, the assumption of personal networks and 
consequently, family-based migration, is only one explanation of migration. 
Therefore, in this section, I discuss the inadequacies of the social networks approach 
in migration. First, while the power of networks lies in the tightly-knitted relations, I 
argue that there is possibility of a “loosening” of migration networks. First, migration 
networks increasingly refer to social relations beyond that of the family and second, 
these ties are not inherently collaborative. What I propose is thus a deviation from 
ideas of migration networks are primarily rooted in family units or being part of 
tightly-knitted communities. Most importantly, the bases of social networks are 




there are several kinds of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) 
available, allowing them to be connected to various opportunities and resources 
(Vertovec 2004; Panagakosa 2003).  
My argument implies that there are changes in the ways in which networks 
are formed and sustained. The evolution of networks is another theme which will be 
explored in this thesis, especially in chapter five. In a review of migration networks 
and systems, Gurak and Caces (1992) discuss four themes surrounding networks and 
migration – function, adaptation, selectivity and evolution. The first three deal with 
issues of integration and linkages between communities and societies and 
recruitment respectively, which are common issues in the field. This thesis focuses 
on the fourth theme, which is the “evolution” of networks. Gurak and Fe Caces note 
that despite the variability in form in networks, researchers have largely assumed that 
kinship is the social base of networks. The diversification of social bases challenges 
a related concept termed ‘homophily’ which refers to the logic that similarity breeds 
connection (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001); personal networks are thus 
homogenous or highly similar. Following the suggestion of McPherson et al (2001), 
this thesis explores the changing dynamics of networks and consequently challenges 
the assumption that networks stem from a common source and produce similar 
information. Though inherently personal, networks can be fundamentally rooted in 
bases outside of kinship ties.  
Another critique focuses on the impact of networks. While networks are often 
discussed in a positive light, Gold (2005) suggests that there are negative aspects 
which are less known in the literature.  Alongside positive outcomes such as 




structures for the transmission and perpetuation of inequality. Waldinger (1997) 
adopts this perspective and argues that the exclusivity induced by networks may 
trigger a conflicting form of social closure: people within the network end up 
competing rather than assisting each other. Migration networks, many of which are 
organised along ethnic lines, are thus not necessarily nodes of solidarity.  In a similar 
vein, researchers note that there is negative social capital (Portes 1998) when 
dishonest agents collude with fellow village men to take advantage of other migrants. 
Furthermore, networks are not always collaborative in nature, even amongst ethnic 
groups which are thought to possess a high level of solidarity. In their assessment of 
hometown associations, Waldinger, Popkins and Magana (2008) discover that there 
are many tensions when immigrants negotiate their identities between home and host 
societies. While people within a particular network cluster possess some degree of 
similarity, the network cluster is not always collaborative. The globalising influences 
from the internet and ICTs cause internal contestations within communities of 
people. This further dampens the assumption that networks are reciprocal and self-
sustaining.  
While much of the discourse centres on networks being self-perpetuating due 
to the inherent trust and reciprocity in familial relations, networks are equally 
discontinuous. In the case of Brazilian migration to Japan, Higuchi (2010) finds that 
migrants choose to sustain some forms of social networks but not others. Therefore, 
in Higuchi’s study, migration networks have the potential for trust and reciprocity, 
but these traits do not always materialise. In addition, Higuchi notes that Brazilian 
migration is highly dependent on recruiters and market mediators (Higuchi 2010: 
88). On the contrary, old ideas of migration networks hold the assumption that 




case surfaces the question of whether there are other social structures present which 
serves to sustain migration flows since personal ties are not always resilient. 
 
2.3 Institutional Perspectives: Businesses and the State 
 As such, I shift my focus to institutions. This section highlights the 
importance of institutional perspectives alongside network perspectives. While there 
are many accounts of migrant experiences (Harney Dr and Baldassar 2007; Silveya 
and Lawsonb 1999), the institutional perspective on migration remains a less popular 
one. The works which deal with institutional aspects of migration examine the 
political aspects of migration such as the role of institutions (Hollifield 2008; 
Bertocchi, G. and C. Strozzi 2008), political mobilisation (Bousetta 2000) and 
immigrant rights (Bosniak 2006; Rubio-Marín 2000; Whelan 1981). However, less 
emphasis is placed on how these institutional perspectives interact with existing 
approaches or how these institutional perspectives relate to issues outside the 
political realm. My thesis aims to address this gap. 
There are however some exceptions. In a review of institutional theories of 
migration, Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino and Taylor (1993: 450) 
suggest that various institutions, both private and voluntary, emerged with the onset 
of international migration to “satisfy the demand created by an imbalance between 
the large number of people who seek entry into capital-rich countries and the limited 
number of immigrant visas these countries typically offer (Massey et al 1993: 450).” 
Private enterprises are proliferating in hopes of capitalising on demands brought 
about by migration today. These services include “surreptitious smuggling across 




employers and migrants; counterfeit documents and visas; arranged marriages 
between migrants and legal residents or citizens of the destination country; and 
lodging, credit, and other assistance in countries of destination (Massey et al 1993: 
451).”  Some lucrative aspects of migration include marriage migration (Wang and 
Chang 2002; Lu 2005), immigration consultancy services (Tseng 1997) and 
recruitment processes (Jones and Pardthaisong 1999). In addition, there is also 
growing interest in non-profit organisations (Gibson, Law and McKay 2001) and 
international organisations (Hune 1991) in migrant issues. These include recruitment 
migrant activism, migrant aid and shelter.  The presence of institutions, both profit-
oriented and voluntary, affirms the argument that migration is increasingly dependent 
on the work of formal institutions. Due to the large-scale and diffused nature of 
migration today, it is likely that the reliance on institutions is steadily increasing, so 
as to address the diverse demands from a heterogeneous migrant population. 
‘Migration institution’ is a concept which Massey mentions in his works on the 
social origins and networks of migration (Massey 1998; 1999), where he 
acknowledges the significance of migration institutions but does not elaborate on this 
concept. The lack of specificity regarding migration institutions is another gap this 
thesis addresses. In chapter six, I elaborate on the concept of the migration industry.  
Another key institution is the state. The role of the state in an era of prevalent 
migration is a contested issue. While some argue that globalisation is eroding borders 
to the extent that states no longer have significant roles, others suggest that states 
remain equally important due to their role of enabling or restricting migration. I thus 
argue that the role of the state is a heightened one in a globalised environment 
because migration, while global in nature, is ultimately directed at nation states. This 




migration industry serving China-Singapore migration. In a bid to highlight the role 
of the state in international migration, Weiner (1985) proposes three vital roles of the 
state. First, the will of states shape migration patterns; it takes one state to permit 
emigration and another to allow immigration for a certain migration flow to develop. 
Second, on a larger level, states shape international migration patterns through their 
policies on immigration and emigration. Third, while each state has its own 
migration issues, such issues are increasingly becoming internationalised, thus 
changing the dynamics of governance and conflict in sending and receiving states. 
Through its regulations and daily operations, the state shapes larger migration flows. 
For example, the political functions of the state work in tandem with its economic 
strategies. Bangladeshi migration to East and Southeast Asia is influenced by 
economic conditions (Lian and Rahman 2006). The growing economies of this 
region are dependent on short-term labour, usually for the construction industry. This 
need for labour is not a temporary one but rather, a permanent requirement for the 
functioning of these economies. Therefore, migration continues to be highly-
regulated by the state.  
In this section, I have highlighted several institutions which facilitate 
migration: profit-oriented institutions, voluntary/humanitarian institutions and 
national states. However, the listing of these institutions is by no means an 
institutional explanation of migration. Therefore, I now turn to migration networks to 





2.4 Combining Institutions and Networks Perspectives 
I have three objectives in bringing together the perspectives of institutions 
and networks. The first is to examine the intersections between social networks and 
institutional workings of migration processes. In migration studies, networks are 
usually discussed in terms of social ties and relations. On the other hand, institutions 
are typically associated with economic and political action. Second, this synthesis 
brings a more nuanced view of migration by paying attention to both individuals and 
structures. There are many studies which focus on either migrant place-making 
strategies/experiences (Dych 2005; Anderderson 2010; Conradson and Latham 2005; 
Cresswell 2010, Favell, Feldblum and Smith 2006) or the role of the state and 
businesses (Massey 1999; Tseng 1999). The latter however, remains a less mature 
body of literature. In integrating these perspectives, I aim to achieve a more holistic 
picture of migratory processes. Third, such a perspective allows for the examination 
of social/personal dynamics of migration within the larger international context.  
Most notably, an example of an integrated perspective in migration studies is 
the work on global body shopping (Xiang 2007). Xiang explores the relationship 
between networks and political economy. He does by examining the world systems 
perspective of labour within structural functionalist analyses. These seemingly 
contradictory paradigms yield a particularly interesting finding: Indian kinship ties in 
the form of dowry, play a significant role is shaping industry trends. Evolving social 
ties are thus implicating larger trends such as the value of IT workers, the influx of 
IT workers overseas and the perception of IT workers from Indian. This is the benefit 




However, this integration of perspectives may at times seem implausible: 
networks, which are rooted in personal ties, seem to diametrically oppose the context 
of large and formal institutions. Yet, I argue that networks of the past are undergoing 
changes due to the forces of globalisation. Networks are more accessible and 
network formations are more diffused. Taking the globalisation of Chinese 
associations as an example, Chinese networks which are often conceptualised as 
highly personal are often the pillars of Chinese ethnic associations. However, this 
focus on ancestral rootedness is not resilient to the forces of globalisation. While 
there is an inherent tension between intimate ethnic relations and institutionalised 
organisation linkages, scholars have suggested that Chinese associations are 
complementary with globalisation. These old ethnic linkages are increasingly 
morphing into new global networks through various international events 
involvements such as intentional conventions organised by transnational 
entrepreneurs (Liu 1998: 587). Moreover, undergirding these conventions are 
international coordinating entities and permanent secretariats (Liu 1998: 587). 
Consequently, these events cause Chinese networks to broaden and proliferate, thus 
legitimising these seemingly outdated institutions which are centred on hometown 
linkages. Therefore, while local networks are crucial, its survival is contingent on 
globalising strategies. The combination of local networks and global institutions 
provides a fresh perspective on the renewal of outmoded organisations through the 
proliferation of new networks and subsequent institutions. In what follows, I 
highlight three ways in which I combine these perspectives, and discuss the issues 





2.5 Framing Old Chinese Migration Vis-à-vis New Chinese Migration 
I use the concepts of networks and institutions to examine old and new 
Chinese migration. I reason that these features are common through the history of 
Chinese migration and thus act as points of comparison. Chinese networks deserve 
particular attention because the literature predominantly agrees that there are strong 
personal and cultural dimensions to these ties. In other words, Chinese culture 
promotes the formation of close and tight networks and these alliances are used for 
instance, in business and migration, in order to promote self-interest. This culturalist 
perspective is one which I challenge later on in this thesis, by suggesting that the 
Chinese in this globalising era have more weak ties than they do strong ties. 
 
Chinese Networks as Social and Economic Organising Principles of Migration 
There is a sizeable literature which argues that the Chinese have a propensity 
towards the formation of personal and ethnic networks. The outcome of this is the 
presence of Chinese institutions. Chinese networks are thus organising principles for 
Chinese societies (Cheng & Rosett 1991; Hwang 1987).  
Applying this to migration, the strength of the network perspective thus lies 
in its emphasis on the non-economic processes. The Chinese idea of personal 
relations extends beyond a simple relationship between two parties; it contains an 
element of reciprocity. Guanxi is defined as the “a set of interpersonal connections 
that facilitate exchange of favors between people on a dyadic basis (Bian and Ang 
1997).” Ang and Bian (1997: 984) state two traits of Guanxi; the first being intimacy 
and the second being trustworthiness. Respectively, Guanxi occurs between people 




materials or sentiments. Guanxi is critical for gaining access to employment contacts 
(Bian and Ang 1997) or business opportunities (Barton 1983). These ties put users in 
a position of advantage. Yao describes Guanxi in business as a strategy to tap on a 
legitimate system of cultural values when the person is in a position of weakness 
(Yao 1987: 91). This idea of networks being a mode of advancement does not only 
apply to the Chinese (Poros 2001). Since Guanxi is not institutionalised, trust is 
highly important for sustaining it (Bian and Ang 1997: 984). 
 
Chinese Institutions 
However, Chinese networks are not always personal in nature. Wong and 
Salaff (1998: 360-361) describe networks as a form of capital, which at times take on 
‘institutional’ forms such as associations. Relatedly, they consider the heterogeneous 
capacities for network formations through the concept of ‘network capacity’. This 
paves the way for a more elaborated network analysis in contrast to the restricted and 
traditional network analysis which privileges kinship and strong relations. The 
institutionalisation of Chinese networks is evident in the movement of Chinese 
labour (Wang 2008), with the three most important recruitment channels being 
internal transfer in transnational corporations, social networks and private 
recruitment agency. With its institutional focus, this study challenges the culturalist 
view of networks –that were popular in the 1990s- which suggest that networks 
amongst the Chinese are driven purely by personal relations (Gomez and Hsiao 
2003; 2004).  
The Chinese temples are crucial points of contacts for Chinese immigrants. 




migrants as well as new migrants. This demonstrates the close relationship between 
ethnicity, community and religion. In other words, the Chinese rely heavily on ethnic 
ties as community support. Second, it provides essential social services (Frost 2005: 
43) such as a space for socialising and entertainment. Later on, fraternal associations 
emerged with the purpose of facilitating the observation of customary rituals 
involved in festivals, ancestral worship and burials. Finally, it also stands as welfare 
organisations, sponsors of education and tribunals for the settlement of disputes 
(Frost 2005: 43). The temples are therefore common spaces which join the Chinese 
community, and they are also storehouse of resources. 
Clans are also traditional representations of ethnic organisations. Yet, these 
organisations are not homogenous. The Chinese see clan membership in terms of 
identity and belonging. For the wealthy members, being in a leadership position in a 
clan is prestigious (Yen 1981). Similar to temples, clans also have the functions of 
supporting ancestral worship and social activities (Yen 1981: 67). Its overriding role 
however, is to maintain ties of members who belong to Chinese dialect groups in 
various parts of the world. The peak of this achievement was in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries when dialect differences were palpable in Singapore and 
Malaya, so much so that the Chinese gravitated only towards their own dialect 
groups. As such, while the clans aimed to unite the overseas Chinese, it ironically 
resulted in highly distinct boundaries within the Chinese community.  
2.6 Conceptualising New Network Dynamics and a New Social Organisation 
 In chapter five, I expound on my assertion that there is a ‘new network 
dynamics’ amongst Chinese immigrants. I suggest that network formations and 




immigrants are relying less on personal relations and more on ties to formal 
institutions. However, this argument is not meant to polarise the concepts of 
networks and institutions; instead, what I aim to do is to highlight the 
complementarity of these concepts, and to suggest that combining these perspectives 
provides a fresh dimension to migration accounts.  
 
“Massey Model” of Migration Networks and its Inadequacies 
 Undergirding this argument is a critique of the Massey model of migration 
networks. In what follows, I examine the origins, usage and limitations of the 
concept of migration networks. Douglass Massey’s popularised the notion of 
migration networks in the 1980s. Through a series of works, he discusses the social 
origins of migration networks and explains the social processes undergirding 
migration. Three perspectives frame Massey’s works. First, migration is defined as 
“social process in which basic human relationships are adapted to play new “roles” in 
the migratory enterprise (1986: 111).” Second, personal networks –kinship, 
friendship, and community ties- underpin the social organisation of immigration. 
Using the case of Mexican immigrants to the US, Massey reasons that since familial 
ties consist of a high degree of trust, they serve as the immigrants’ “most 
secure…connections” (1986: 104). Finally, these networks perpetuate themselves 
internally through kinship ties, and are also strengthened externally by “institutional 
mechanisms ranging from the fiesta of the patron saint to United States-based soccer 
club (1986: 111).” Networks are embedded in established institutions and are 
iterative and self-sustaining; they find their roots in personal relations and exist 




(Krissman 2005) of migration networks, this concept entails six principles (Massey 
1987: 4-6): first, migration occurs amidst structural changes in either or both sending 
and receiving places. Second, migration processes occur along with the development 
of migratory infrastructure where migration “eventually develops a social 
infrastructure that enables movement on a mass basis” (Massey et al 1987: 4). In 
short, personal relationships form support structures for migrants. Third, migration is 
inherently a familial decision. As migration becomes more common, it is likely that 
it becomes part of familial strategies for survival or advancement, “with the timing of 
migration determined by life cycle changes that affect the relative number of 
dependents and workers in the household”. Due to its reliance on familial networks, 
fourth, migration is a self-perpetuating process. The assumption here is that network 
contacts are stable and cumulative because of close personal ties. Fifth, networks are 
cumulative and resilient with the assumption that return migration is very regular 
amongst immigrants. Sixth, not all migrants are return-migrants. Massey notes that 
“settlement of some migrants within the receiving society is inevitable”. Overall, 
migration occurs due to structural and socio-economic changes in societies, and is 
sustained by very intricate network dynamics amongst friends and kin. These 







Figure 2: The migration network concept which discusses the different levels of relationships 
(Krissman 2005: 15) 
 Massey’s framework (1987) serves as the basis for several studies. The case 
of family-oriented migration is not a new phenomenon, nor is it specific to 
contemporary society. In fact, an argument could be made that the reliance on 
personal networks is an intuitive strategy for survival and sustenance. One such 
example is that of a 19
th
 century Swedish agricultural community which engaged in 
mass emigration to the US. In this community, kinship networks were known to be 
tools to “bolster… security” (Ostergren 1982: 299). Networks were established 
mainly through marriages. Chain migration was prevalent and resulted in “socially 
cohesive, kinship communities on the American agricultural frontier.” These network 




to Singapore for example, demonstrates the importance of village/community 
networks in the self-perpetuation of migration. Undergirding these relations are the 
notions of reciprocity, obligation and trust (Rahman 2010). Aside from the Mexican 
and Bangladeshi cases, the literature is replete with instances of migration involving 
personal ties, and especially kinship networks (Banerjee 1983; Heering, Liesbeth, 
Van der Erf and Van Wissen 2004).  
  The migration network concept although fundamental, is inadequate on 
several fronts. Krissman (2005: 4) argues that the kinship-oriented nature of the 
concept restricts its explanations to the realm of the family and community. 
Furthermore, with its emphasis on the micro-level processes, networks do not explain 
“large-scale international migration flows”. So the first critique is that Massey’s 
migration networks restricts international phenomenon to local-level explanations. 
Second, migration networks are not confined to kinship, friendship and community. 
In this new migration context where transnational and virtual ties are numerous, 
migrants do not only rely on personal or familial networks. After Massey’s work, 
Boyd (1989) acknowledged that research on migration networks often focuses on 
friendship, community and family ties, and yet these are not the only possible 
triggers of migration. It was also in the 1990s when researchers called for a revision 
of the concept of “network” to include sociological insights. Adding to these, I 
suggest, third, that the migration networks concept be examined on a broader 
institutional level. This is to shed light on the ‘large-scale’ perspectives that 
Krissman (2005) argues are missing. International migration today is no longer a 
social process within the family unit, but one between nations and industries. 
Institutional perspectives open up new perspectives to understand migration. It is 




rethink the concept of migration networks from a non-familial perspective. In 
addition, I draw attention to the evolving social bases of migration networks: the 
social bases of migration networks are increasingly institutionalised – they are 
organised as formal relations rather than informal and personal ones. Nevertheless, 
both personal and institutional networks are not mutually exclusive. Therefore, to 
some degree then, my argument counters previous understanding of migration 
networks that are anchored in kinship ties. 
 
2.7 Conceptualising Institutional Networks and the Migration industry 
 Since networks are becoming more institutionalised, I propose the idea of 
‘institutional networks’ which I argue, underpin the migration industry. I broadly 
define this as the networks and associations an individual has towards institutions, 
and suggest that these institutional networks are increasingly important in an era 
where migration is arranged along organisational lines. This means that migration is 
a highly differentiated phenomenon with functionally defined aspects such as 
recruitment or logistics. Logically, various institutions specialising in specific roles 
emerge to address these needs.  
Institutional networks are thus functionally-driven and differ significantly 
from personal networks which are underpinned by trust and reciprocity. To further 
define institutional networks, I compare this with trust networks (Figure 3). Tilly 
defines trust networks as “ramified interpersonal connections, consisting mainly of 
strong ties, within which people set valued, consequential, long-term resources and 
enterprises at risk to the malfeasance, mistakes, or failures of others” (Tilly 2007: 7). 




and kinship group” are examples of groups supported by trust networks. Trust 
networks are often applied to understanding migration which relies on informal or 
personal relations rather than formal institutions. To summarise, Tilly distils trust 
networks in a few points: first, they are based on solidarity between people. Second, 
they are long-term and driven by obligations. Third, by virtue of being based on 
kinship, they are usually contracted in specialised areas. Fourth, the sense of 
territoriality is strong given that there are clear divisions between insiders of the 
community and outsiders. Fifth, the perpetuation of these networks is achieved when 
migrants enter the host society and segregate themselves and concurrently choose to 
integrate mainly with fellow immigrants. This safeguards the bases of communal 
ties, which sustains the workings of trust networks. Finally, the parochial workings 
of these networks limit opportunities to specific geographical areas and social 
groups. In Granovetter’s terms (1973), these strong ties are weak because they only 
give access to a restricted pool of resources. In my thesis, the concept of trust 
networks is used to refer to personal networks in old migration processes.  
Trust Networks (Tilly 2007: 5-6) 
1. Maintains solidarity between people at the origins and 
destinations  
2. Members acquire long-term rights and obligations binding 
themselves to each other 
3. Tend to concentrate in relatively specialized economic, 
geographic, and social area 
4. Networks creates and depends on boundaries that separate 
members from outsiders 
5. Survival of networks depends on the social segregation or 
integration of the immigrants  
6. Confines members to a relatively narrow range of opportunities 
(work, housing, sociability, and welfare) 




 On the contrary, my proposed ‘institutional networks’ operate on opposing 
principles (Figure 4). I argue that institutional networks are on the rise while personal 
or trust networks are on the decline. I suggest six characteristics of institutional 
networks. First, a migrant’s involvement with an institution could be on a one-off 
basis. Once the function has been met, there may not be reasons for the migrant to 
approach that same organisation again. Second, the involved parties are bound by 
business contracts or industry regulations. Migrants often turn to job agencies or 
governmental departments to seek help with their application. However, they could 
also not be bounded by any formal agreement and this is seen when workers are 
exploited due to lack of documentation from job agencies. Third, membership 
boundaries are not distinct. Migrant organisations, due to their institutionalised 
procedures, have the abilities to serve a wide diversity of migrants unlike ethnic 
associations which only serve a particular ethnic hometown-based group. Fourth, the 
survival of institutional networks or migrant institutions is dependent on the lack of 
ties between migrants. In contrast to older immigrants who relied heavily on their 
families, newer ones rely on any institutional help they can locate. The existence of 
migrant institutions today is thus perpetuated by the lack of social ties between 
migrants and within migrant groups. Finally, due to the widespread nature of 
institutional networks, migrants who rely on them expose themselves to a range of 








1. One-off and impersonal 
2. Involved parties are bound by business contracts, or not 
bound by any contract 
3. Networks are widespread and diverse 
4. Boundaries are not clear; organisations accommodate 
diversity pools of people 
5. Survival of networks depends on the lack of networks 
between immigrants 
6. Members are free to construct that networks and are 
open to a wide range of opportunities 
Figure 4: My definition of ‘institutional networks’ 
 
Migration industry and Related Concepts 
By discussing institutional networks, I also invoke a discussion on the 
institutions dealing with migratory procedures. Collectively, I term the interaction of 
these networks and institutions the ‘migration industry’, and explore this idea in 
greater depth in chapter six, which argues that the rise of the migration industry 
follows the increasing reliance on institutional networks. To recognise the migration 
industry is to be aware of the growing economic aspects of immigration. Scholars 
contend that the concept involves a few aspects. First, it involves actors, both legal 
and illegal, who are involved in the capitalising on migratory processes. Related 
concepts include “migration merchant” (Kyle) which refers to the agents profiting 
from the commercialisation of migratory processes. These merchants profit from 
migrant-exporting schemes (Kyle and Dale 2001:32-33). Similarly, Castles and 
Miller (2003: 28) suggest that “recruitment organizations, lawyers, agents, 
smugglers, and other intermediaries” are potential actors in the migration industry. 




He conceptualises “migration entrepreneurs” as people from the same ethnic group 
who tap on mobility and remittances opportunities within their own ethnic circle. 
Specifically, these entrepreneurs provide travel, legal, employment and smuggling 
assistance. More recently, Hernández-León (2008: 155) adopts a broader view of the 
migration industry, stating that it could include various actors, both legal and illegal. 
More importantly, he asserts that this industry “’greases’ the engines of international 




 The methodology is devised to capture both the nuances of migrant social 
networks and understand larger institutional structures. There are two parts to the 
interviewing process: I interviewed Chinese immigrants and representatives of 
institutions. In all, I conducted twenty five interviews; seventeen with Chinese 
immigrants and the remaining eight with institutional representatives. Of the 
seventeen immigrants, six were non-professional workers and eleven were 
professionals working in Singapore.  
The new Chinese immigrants in my study are extremely diverse. They 
constitute the new wave of immigrants who migrated from China during a time when 
China has integrated itself into the global economy. This globalising context enables 
migration across a wide spectrum; groups of migrants during this time are varied in 
their origins, educational levels and socio-economic statuses. These migrants come 
from various regions across China and work in many industries including tourism, 




ages ranged from early-20s up to mid-40s. All respondents came to Singapore during 





Interviewee Hometown  Age  Industry  Occupation Status Gender  




Hospitality  Chambermaid 
Non-
Professional M 







3. Zhou Wa Shandong  
Mid 





4. Wei Tian Henan 
Late 





5. Chen Wei Fujian  
Early 





6. Lin Yuan Zhejiang 
Late 





7. Li Mei Jiang Su  
Late 
30s  Education  Educator  Professional F 
8. Zheng 
Hao Harbin  
Mid 
20s Education  Educator  Professional M 
9. Wei Yang Xi'An 
Late 
20s Education  Educator  Professional M 
10. Zhou Wen Jiang Xi 
Mid 
20s Education  Educator  Professional M 
11. Yang Li Harbin  
Mid 
20s Education  Educator Professional M 
12. Shou Min Shandong  
Mid 
20s Engineering  Engineer  Professional M 
13. Li Heng Chao Zhou 
Mid 








Executive Professional M 
15. Sun Li Beijing 
Late 
20s Finance  
Investment 
Manager Professional F 
16. Wen Li Shanghai  
Mid 
20s Finance  Auditor Professional F 
17. Wei Zhen Shanghai  
Mid 
20s Finance Compliance Professional F 




This diversity of new Chinese immigrants will be further discussed in the next 
chapter.  
Locating a diverse group of relevant individuals required several strategies 
(Figure 5). First, I relied on personal contacts. This yielded mainly contacts of 
Chinese professionals working in Singapore. Second, seeing the need to diversify my 
pool of respondents, I approached a migrant humanitarian organisation called the 
Humanitarian Organization for Migrant Economics (HOME)
i1
. Through this 
organisation, I was connected to several less-skilled workers who were at that 
juncture, experiencing predicaments at work - some needed legal advice from the 
HOME while others were there to use the computers or for language classes. Apart 
from meeting interviewees at HOME itself, I also obtained other contacts from 
HOME and met up with interviewees individually. Some workers having resolved 
their employment issues, rarely return to HOME and so I had to meet them near their 
workplaces. However, there are also less-skilled workers who are not embroiled in 
legal cases and are in legitimate and unproblematic labour contracts. To get in touch 
with this group of people was particularly difficult because they are less visible; they 
are not concentrated in migrant centres nor are easily spotted in public. Due to their 
hectic work schedules which sometimes involve night-shifts, many of these migrants 
                                                 
1
 HOME’s vision and mission: HOME is committed to the principle that migration of people benefits 
the global society with a focus on the effects of migration within the context of Singapore. The 
mission objectives of HOME are: 
• To develop research and education on the socioeconomic of migration on Singapore and the 
countries of origin; 
• To provide social integration services for emigrants and immigrants; 
• To provide humanitarian assistance for the effects of 'crisis' migration.  
We believe that the rights to Dignity of Work, Dignity of Person and the Dignity of Life are 
fundamental human rights. Migrant populations in many countries are often discriminated when it 
comes to the protection of these rights. HOME seeks to uphold human dignity for all peoples 




spend the bulk of their time in their dorms/flats and worksites. This leaves little time 
for social activities. Therefore, third, I followed a group of labour unionists into 
factory worksites so as to observe the work culture. When time permitted, I spoke 
briefly to a few of the workers. Each of these interviews lasted about an hour or 
slightly over an hour. 
 
Figure 5: Interviewee Subgroups and Strategies Used to Contact Them 
In addition, I interviewed a range of people working in organisations dealing 
with immigration issues (Figure 6). This is in line with my argument which states 
that institutions are becoming more central to immigration processes. These 
institutions fall into three categories: voluntary organisations, private enterprises and 








Representatives Positions Organisation/Institution Type  of Organisation  
1. Ian Exco Member  Loving & Giving Society  
Charity society stated by 
new Chinese immigrants  
2. Ms Goh  Management  Contact Singapore  Government Agency  
3. Mr Tan and 
Ms Lin Management  
National Talent and 
Population Division  Government Agency  
4. Randall  
Mobility 
Consultant Mobility Company  
Private Sector, Mobility 
Industry  
5. Kieran Exco Member  University Alumni Group  University Alumni Group  
6. Steven  HR Manager   MNC, HR Department, 
Private Sector, 
Manufacturing Industry  
7. Fazial  Headhunter 
International Recruitment 
Company  
Private Sector, Recruitment 
Industry  
8. Natalie Headhunter 
International Recruitment 
Company  
Private Sector, Recruitment 
Industry  
Figure 6: Profile of institutions interviewed 
First, I sent formal email requests to two government departments, requesting 
for interviews, as part of my thesis fieldwork. The email addresses were found on 
public and official government directories and were readily available online. Emails 
were sent to the directors who could refer me to specific department heads. 
Thereafter, I went down to these government offices to meet with various officials to 
discuss issues such as the channels through which new immigrants enter Singapore 
and the need for new immigrants and integration initiatives. Second, through key 
informants, I got fairly acquainted with the work of voluntary organisations such as 
university alumni groups or the Loving & Giving Society. They would inform me of 
public events or talks and I would attend them. Subsequently, I requested for 
interviews with the representatives of these organisations. Third, private companies 
were the hardest to contact due to the lack of public information on the owners and 
employees. For this category of respondents, I relied on personal contacts. It took 




one HR director in his office and the other two recruitment and mobility 
professionals after working hours.  
 
Figure 7: Summary of the categories of interviewees and the strategies used 
This data collection process lasted around five months. All interviews were collated 
and transcribed. Verbatim transcriptions were filed.   
 
Coding and Data Analysis  
Subsequently, I coded the interview data around these three categories: new 
Chinese immigration, networks and migration industry and businesses. For each of 
these categories, I developed related themes and arranged them in an excel file with 
sub-themes in the rows and the interview quotes in the columns (Figure 8). 
Thereafter, I generated sub-themes for each category (Figure 9). Each of these 
columns in Figure 9 forms a chapter of the thesis. In the subsequent chapters, I will 





















2. New Networks:  3. New Industries  
a) Personal details:  a. Social Networks in 
Singapore: 
1. Growing opportunities: 
Place of origin  Migrant Hang out  Growth in Asia  
Age Mainly PRCs Business Opportunities (Origin) 
Job  PRC Network: channels, 
activities  
Business opportunities (Destinations) 
b) Motivations: Other networks: 
professions, religions 
 




2. Middlemen/agencies: Lacking details, role 
of middlemen 
Plans to work 
elsewhere 
Virtual Ties   
c) Job scope:  3. Institutional Recruitment: 
Issues at work b. Lack of social networks: Institutions running programmes  
 Lack of SG friends  MOE, Multinationals 
 Limited social networks 
at work  
Recruitment in batches 
  4. Related industries: 
 c. Transnational Networks:  Mobility consultant 
 Personal transnational 
ties  
Headhunting 
 Lack of transnational 
networks – need to rely 
on middlemen  
5. Industry needs in Singapore 
 Transnational virtual - 
Finding a job through 
website  
MOE Recruiting teachers from abroad – 
specialised recruitment 
 Transnational corporate 
-  Companies 
outsourcing to 
headhunting companies  
Filling industry needs: institutional 
matching 
  Target Group: Skilled Foreigners and 
Skilled Singaporeans 
 d. Lack of involvement in 
community:  
the need for foreign workers: filling 
company need 
 Clan Associations: 
losing relevance? 




 Reliance on Institutional 
or Online help  
     Marketing and promotion: operations 
 
   
 e. Middlemen matters:  
 Job search   
 Controversies   
   
 f. New networks and 
channels:  
 
 Recruitment industry in 
SG and the channels 
 
 Involvement in Clubs 
and Clan Associations 
 
 Revamping Clan 
Associations 
 
 University Alumni: 









CHINESE MIGRATION: COLONIAL TO GLOBAL 
This chapter presents a historical overview of Chinese migration from the 
colonial era to the late 20
th
 Century. Focusing on the case of Singapore, I argue that a 
broad overview of these historical stages reveals that the pattern of Chinese 
migration has evolved from a concentrated one to being widespread and diffused. In 
so doing, I highlight the differences between the colonial economy and the global 
economy. While the colonial economy focused on resource extraction from specific 
colonies, the global economy is a highly competitive climate which involves many 
actors and organisations. This transition from the colonial economy to a market-led 
global economy leads to increasingly diversified roles of Chinese immigrants. First, 
the colonial period established the social and economic roles of the Chinese in SEA. 
The Chinese contributed significantly to the burgeoning coolie trade and entrepôt 
businesses of that time. Second, the period of nation-building starting from the late 
1950s involved expansion and construction plans, which in turn perpetuated the need 
for foreign labour. This growing demand induced the authorities to liberalise 
immigration policies so as to ease the entry of foreign labour into Singapore. Finally, 
from 1978, China opened its economy to the world. This coincided with the rise of 
the tiger economies in East Asia and the growing global economy. This period was 
one which saw hyper-competition, the rise of the knowledge economy and services 
sectors which dramatically departed from the colonial economy’s method of resource 






3.1 China-Singapore Migration: Push-Pull Factors 
The history of Chinese migration has been extensively documented, with 
scholars agreeing on several critical points. The mass migration after 1840 is one 
such moment (McKeown in Reid 2008: xxiv).  McKeown estimates that there were 
1.35 million Chinese leaving Hong Kong from 1876 to1898 of which over half came 
to Singapore. Many of these migrants were indentured or contract labourers from 
South China, looking for employment in Southeast Asia. From the 1870s onwards, 
there was more pronounced migration towards Singapore and Malaya (Skeldon 
1996).  While the Cantanose were the largest group, there were also the Hokkiens 
from Xiamen and Teochews from Shantou whose populations were growing steadily. 
As such, this phase of Chinese migration was characterised by emigration from the 
Southern parts of China, most of which are coastal states. These migrants were 
known as the “Hua Qiao” or Chinese sojourners/overseas Chinese (Liu 2005) as 
many had intentions to migrate temporarily and to eventually return to China. 
However, for various reasons, many settled in the host countries.  
Many Chinese migrated to Singapore, in part due to the unfavourable 
conditions in China with “floods, droughts, famines and rebellions and even over-
population” (Ee 1961: 33).  One of the most severe famines occurred in 1911 when 
bad harvest coupled with terrible floods, threatened the livelihoods for already 
impoverished people. Sources suggest “about two and a half million” people were 
estimated to be without means of sustenance during this period (Ee 1961: 34)”. 
Moreover, external pressures exacerbated the situation. Political conflicts were rife, 




Rebellion (1900) were instances of political instability which added to the incentives 
to China.  
Working in tandem with these push factors, was a series of economic and 
political pull factors to the SEA region. First, economic opportunities were aplenty. 
Singapore and Malaya were lucrative places for trade and work purposes, as 
producers of rubber and tin. They were part of large British investments and were 
therefore bustling with economic activities. Singapore in particular, was strategically 
located amongst trade links and was itself a free trade entrepôt; it therefore readily 
attracted businesses and immigrants. Second, Singapore was a favourable destination 
for the Chinese due to the presence of political and legal establishments which 
supported China-Singapore migration. There were several political decisions 
affecting the Singapore-China ties. First, migration ties were established between 
China and the British Colonies. By 1860, “the Imperial Government had signed a 
convention with Britain and France whereby Chinese subjects were permitted to 
emigrate and take service in the British colonies or elsewhere beyond the seas” (Ee 
1961: 36). This gave the Chinese ready access to Singapore. Second, sentiments 
towards migration shifted from one of hostility to one of acceptance around 1899. 
This stood in sharp contrast to previous orders to behead Chinese who returned from 
abroad. This revised stance triggered a wave of migration out of China. Third, 
official laws were established for the employment of Chinese in British colonies. In 
so doing, the employment of Chinese labour in the British colonies and protectorates 
became a legitimate and common practice.  In 1904, the Chinese and British 
Governments agreed to jointly supervise indentured migration. This agreement is 
known as the Emigration Convention between the United Kingdom and China (Ee 




Singapore migration flows, and hence the Chinese population in Singapore grew 
substantially from the early 19th Century to the mid-20th Century. The peaks of 
Chinese migration in Singapore occurred between 1910 – 1915 (Figure 10) when 
political strife was rife in China and 1925 – 1930 when political and economic 
conditions were favourable for migration (Figure 10). 
 
Figure 9: Table showing the migration trends in the 19th and 20th Centuries (Ee 1961: 51) 
Broadly, 19
th
 Century Chinese migration to Singapore was driven by economic 
opportunities in SEA, coupled with adverse conditions in China. Many Chinese 
immigrants originally intended to migrate temporarily, but many eventually stayed 





3.2 Colonial Economy  
 Chinese immigrants went on to play a significant role in the colonial 
economy. During the colonial period, there were several industries that prospered 
with the help of Chinese labour – these were the tin, mining and entrepôt businesses. 
Traders have long been attracted to Southeast Asia for its natural resources such as 
tin and rubber. During the colonial period, the Chinese in SEA primarily originated 
from South China, namely the provinces of Kwangtung and Fukien (Unger 1944: 
202), and migrated for the purpose of job opportunities. A few industries in the 
colonial era were dominated by the Chinese.  
 
Tin and Mining 
As the world’s largest tin-producing country in the late 19th Century, the tin 
industry was of particular importance to the Malayan economy. The industry was 
dominantly by a few prominent businessmen such as Eu Tong Seng (Lian and Koh 
2004; Chung 2005). The industry was also dominated by a few family businesses. 
For example, Wong (2007) highlights five families in Penang – Tan, Yeoh, Lim, 
Cheah and Ong- who controlled large tin and mining businesses alongside opium 
farms and import and export businesses. 
 These core industries had a heavy reliance on Chinese labour. The tin 
industry for instance, was dominated by Chinese capital and labour for a long period 
until capital-intensive mining was introduced. A historical overview of the 





clearly shows that the Chinese expanded their dominance in this industry (Jackson 




technological advances set in and opened up opportunities to the non-Chinese. 
According to Jackson (1963: 105), the first phase of the tin industry was the 
“Malayan period” before 1820. This period saw the start of this industry with tin 
production taking place in Kinta, Pahang and parts of Negri Sembilan. According to 
Jackson, most of the work was done by slaves.  
As the industry matured, it entered into another phase from 1820-1850. 
Jackson terms this the “early Chinese period” because it was the first instance of 
Chinese dominance in the industry. Due to British trade treaties, tin was produced in 
Kedah, Perak, Selangor and Johor at this time. The Chinese capitalised on this by 
taking an interest in mining. Historical records suggest that by 1850s, most workers 
in the mining industry were Chinese. In fact, there was already a labour 
differentiation within the industry:  
"In Malacca all the miners are paid by the month, but they are divided 
into three different classes, viz. sinkays, coolies and overseers. By 
Sinkays are meant those who have newly arrived from China, who are 
always engaged for one year by the person who pays their passage 
money to the Captain of the junk and advances them some money for 
sending home, and also agrees to give them money for tobacco and 
shaving (Crookewit in Jackson 1963: 106) 
Typically, the Sinkays became coolies after the first year of service. Evidently, the 
market for Chinese labour was well-developed such that there were stages for 




The third stage is termed “the age of great capitans” which lasted from 1850 
– 1880s (Jackson 1963). During this time, the Chinese expanded their businesses into 
other parts of Malaya, namely Selangor and Larut. A factor which facilitated this 
rapid economic expansion was the close-knitted ties amongst the Chinese. Miners to 
a specific location were often from the same dialect group and/or were part of a 
particular secret society: 
“The miners of Taiping were Hakkas and belonged to the Hai San 
secret society; the miners of Kamunting were Cantonese and belonged 
to the Ghee Hin secret society (Jackson 1963: 107).” 
Therefore, recruitment was conducted through close ethnic ties and thus ensured that 
the industry continued to thrive under the leadership of a few regional Chinese 
groups. Mining fields offered differential wages. While some paid the coolies by the 
month, others paid annually or based on circumstances. There was little consistency 
amongst these mines as they were owned by a few powerful capitalists, who were 
often headmen of various societies. Up to this point, the tin and mining businesses 
were organised along the lines of informal ethnic relations, thus allowing them to be 
exploitative and yet self-sustaining all at once. This form of social and economic 
organisation persisted until the authorities regulated the industry, and when they did, 
it marked another stage of this industry’s development.  
“The rise of Kinta” from 1880 – 1905 was a period in which the mining 
business became more diffused; economic clout was no longer concentrated in 




coolies to work in. Specifically, from 1884 – 1889, the Chinese mining population of 
Kinta increased, and outnumbered that in Larut.
2
 Consequently, independent 
employers emerged and created competitive ventures and more favourable 
conditions, and this attracted many coolies from Larut. Overtime, the Larut coolies 
moved to Kinta and new employees were managed using a credit system (Jackson 
1963: 108-109). This standardised the process of payment, thus restricting cases of 
exploitation of workers. As the mining industry developed, the Chinese continued to 
dominate:  
“In 1903 there were 186,000 persons actually working in the mines of 
the Federated Malay States.” (Jackson 1963: 112) 
However, with modern advances, this dominance soon came to an end as other 
industry players emerged.  
The fifth phase was the “growth of mechanisation” which occurred from 
1905-1920s. During this period, indentured work became illegal and this lessened the 
dominance of the Chinese in the industry. The long history of reliance on Chinese 
coolies ended as conditions for the exploitation of these Chinese workers became 
less favourable to business owners. However, industry players found others means to 
recruit affordable Chinese labour:    
“(It)… was not unusual to find that the labour force on an estate or 
mine consisted of a number of labourers who had been recruited from 
China by a labour contractor engaged by the management of the 
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place of employment. The contractor paid all the expenses of the 
journey from the native village in China to the place of employment. 
(Often) the majority of the labourers were from the same Chinese 
village as the contractor or from neighbouring villages.” (Blythe in 
Jackson 1963: 114) 
While indentured labour was halted, the practice of recruiting from the same Chinese 
village continued. This ensured that the dominant role of the Chinese persisted. 
Chinese mining businesses continued to rely on ethnic ties to hire workers. The 
informal networks of the Chinese continued to be important, but there were signs of 
recruitment networks becoming more institutionalised as the industry started to be 
regulated.  
Finally, from 1912 onwards, the tin and mining industries became more open 
to external influence (Jackson 1963). Apart from the Chinese, Malays and Indians 
joined the industry. The European introduction of the dredging technique made the 
mining process more accessible (King 1939a) and with this, the “monopoly of (tin) 
production” shifted from the Chinese to the European companies (King 1939b: 130). 
Many technological changes followed and resulted in the rapid production of tin. At 
the same time, the International Tin Control Scheme was introduced, which limited 
production output. Following these developments, the industry became more diverse 
and regulated. In sum, this overview of the industry in Southeast Asia clearly shows 
that the Chinese dominated the industry for a long time until advanced technologies 
and governmental regulations came about. This dominance was in the form of a 
sustainable labour flow from China, as well as an enduring presence of Chinese 




village or clan. Similarly, the expansion of businesses was conducted by way of 
forming alliances with fellow Chinese businessmen.  
As such, I suggest that the social organisation of these major industries during 
the colonial period was ethnically and regionally driven, and largely sustained via 
informal networks, both legal and illegal, in the form of ties with family or ties with 
Chinese societies. Similarly, Chinese labour was prevalent outside of the tin and 
mining industries. Take the case of Malaya; apart from tin, it has a wide range of 
plantations and agricultural resources such as rubber, rice, pineapples, coconuts, oil 
palm and mangrove forests (King 1939a). Chinese owners relied on coolies to sustain 
this business. For example, King (1939a: 144) states that the Chinese capitalists were 
fully responsible for allocating work to the coolies. This type of economic 
organisation was likewise evident in the tin and mining enterprises. Therefore, I 
suggest that the colonial economy, which sought to capitalise on the raw material 
found in the SEA region, was driven by Chinese communities which were defined by 
districts of origins and dialects. The coolie trade was thus one of the earliest forms of 
Chinese labour migration to SEA.  
 
The Coolie Trade 
The colonial period marked the rise of the coolie trade between 1840s and 
1920s. The British adopted a laissez-faire policy towards immigration which 
favoured with their commercial and colonial interests (Pang and Lim 1982: 548) and 
triggered a wave of immigration to SEA. The political environment allowed 
companies to readily employ Chinese workers and labourers. Colonial expansion 




economically and physically unsettled back home. Between 1846 and 1940, nineteen 
million Chinese migrated to SEA (Mckeown 2004: 157); many of these migrants 
were able to migrate with help from colonial governments or due to some form of 
obligation and debt systems. Mckeown notes that less than ten per cent of these 
migrants were indentured, and most of them came from the “southern provinces of 
Guangdong and Fujian (McKeown 2004: 158)”.  According to estimates, the largest 
immigrant group between 1895 and 1927 were the Chinese and there were six 
million of them who came to Singapore between 1895 and 1927 alone (Pang and 
Lim 1982: 549). Many of these immigrants followed the pattern of chain migration, 
thus reinforcing the importance of ethnic and familial ties in colonial migration 
(Chng 2005: 604-605). 
Another stimulus for the growth in coolie trade was the labour demand 
emerging due to the end of slavery (Ong 1995: 51). With the end of slavery, 
plantation economies in particular were left with severe labour shortages. In order to 
sustain this critical sector, owners were forced to turn to the surplus of Chinese 
labour. The surplus of Chinese workers meant that owners had a large supply of 
labour, leading to labourers being susceptible to harsh working conditions and 
exploitation. As such, Ong suggests that the end of slavery caused coolies to be 
‘surrogate slaves’ for colonial expansion. Evidently, the economic demands of the 
colonial era thus created an environment which attracted Chinese labour migration to 
Singapore. Apart from this contextual reason, what was it about the dynamics of 
Chinese migration that triggered a stable flow of workers to Singapore? I thus 






Chinese businesses had a tendency to recruit through ethnic communities 
such as dialect groups, guilds and extended families. This is seen from the fact that 
the Chinese consistently dominated certain industries. The first line of recruitment is 
usually via familial relations; it was common for large businesses to pick a fellow 
family member to head operations in another business site. To further consolidate 
their dominance in the industry, prominent families often established economic 
alliances with other important families in the industry. Concurrently, Chinese 
businessmen actively established connections with counterparts from the same 
dialect groups. These alliances took the form of either commercial companies and 
partnerships or sworn brotherhoods (Wong 2007). By forming partnerships, these 
families were able to diversify their businesses and “through interlocking share 
ownership and interlocking directorates, they created a vertically and horizontally 
integrated structure of companies that could facilitate co-ordinated business 
transactions and operations (Wong 2007: 112).”   
In contrast to official family connections, sworn brotherhoods are 
partnerships which are established through informal and sometimes, clandestine 
relations. These are communities of people who are not related by blood, but are 
bound by a common purpose and a great degree of loyalty towards each other 
(McIsaac 2000; Mann 2000). Secret societies are often cited examples of sworn 
brotherhoods. Some Chinese businessmen tapped on these relationships in their 
business dealings. For example, in the case of the tin and mining industries in 




“Through this intricate network of association with the leaders of Ho 
Seng in the east coast of Sumatra, it seems very likely that the big 
five’s Kian Teik Tong could have allied itself with the Ho Seng to play 
a part in organising the coolies’ riots as a form of economic leverage 
in intra-elite commercial competition (Wong 2007: 115).” 
At other times, recruitment via personal relations occurred through these 
communities. Sworn brotherhoods, although perceived by the colonial authorities as 
unlawful and clandestine organisations, had an organising function – they served as a 
self-perpetuating mechanism for the survival of Chinese businesses by ensuring that 
there was always a dependable labour source.  
 In addition, coolies were also being recruited via the contract channel (Ong 
1995). Coolies could agree to a contract indicating the length of service or the form 
of labour. Even so, this kind of recruitment usually involved Chinese middlemen 
tasked to recruit batches of Chinese workers from a particular village or dialect 
group. The clustering of certain dialect groups in a particular industry occurred 
because recruitment was done through strong personal ties. Recruitment channels 
were thus very focused on personal networks and ties. In an era where information 
technologies were absent, this strategy of tapping on ethnic clusters was effective as 
it ensured a sustainable flow of labour.  
As the industry matured, the varied forms of recruitment proliferated. Soon, 
there were credit systems in place. These systems were supported by “brokers for 
large European trading houses, or coolie ships recruitment” (Ong 1995: 52). In some 
sense, this was similar to the idea of contract labour, only through an institutionalised 




also pay a sizeable amount to brokers and make their way to Singapore on their own. 
Sponsors for this sum of money usually include clan associations. Due to the lack of 
regulation and information technologies in those days, deception was common. The 
brokers involved in facilitating these moves were under immense pressures to meet 
quotas and often resorted to duping some workers into becoming coolies. Under all 
conditions, workers were expected to commit several years to working in Singapore 
(Wang 1978). This recruitment channel persists today, but has become more 
institutionalised and formal. I will expound on this in chapter five.  
 Therefore, the burgeoning tin and mining businesses required a steady inflow 
of workers. Since many of these enterprises belonged to Chinese businessmen or 
families, they often tapped on ethnic networks to ensure there was enough manpower 
at worksites. Given that they relied on ethnic networks in the forms of families, 
clans, dialect groups and even secret societies and given this wide range of networks, 
it is not surprising that the Chinese continued to dominant certain sectors. While 
many of these recruitment methods were based on informal ties, they were 
nevertheless dependable and sustainable. This tightly-knitted and ethnically-oriented 
pattern characterised the social and economic organisation of Chinese migration 
during the colonial era. In other words, the colonial economy depended largely on 
strong ethnic ties and communities.  
 
Entrepôt Industry 
Another key feature of the colonial economy was entrepôt trade. In the 19
th
 
Century, Singapore was a thriving port city. With limited land, Singapore inevitably 




three types of trade flourished (Turnbull 1989) with the first being international trade 
which involved the import of commodities for local consumption, and the export of 
domestic products. Another was the transhipment trade which referred to the transfer 
of goods from one ship to another while passing through Singapore. Most crucially 
was entrepôt trade which dealt with the distribution of imported products, especially 
the ones produced in the Malay Archipelago. Profit was generated through the 
various services such as re-packaging and grading of these products, which also 
meant that exports from Singapore were always of greater value than the imports. In 
so doing, Singapore was able to sustain itself financially despite not having land or 
agriculture.  
Several reasons accounted for the success of the port activities. Singapore’s 
strategic position at the southern end of the Malay Peninsular attracted trades from 
China, Southeast Asia, India and Europe. In fact, it took a while for Singapore to 
establish its position as a key port city as the presence of other ports in Hong Kong 
and Canton were more closely linked to China (Wong 1978: 53). However, trade 
networks soon expanded with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. Trade networks 
proliferated and trade activities increased, adding to the vibrancy of this port.  
Another crucial factor for its success was its status as a free port. This was 
instituted by Sir Stanford Raffles in 1819 and allowed for ships to be exempted from 
payment of import and export duties and related charges. This added to Singapore’s 
competitiveness, especially for Chinese merchants who had been paying significant 
amounts in Dutch-controlled ports. According to King (1939a: 145), Singapore soon 
attracted significant junk trade from China and neighbouring countries. Due to 




of a mangrove swamp into a port by the Tanjong Pagar Dock Company, Ltd., and the 
expropriation of the company by the Government of the Straits Settlements in 1905.” 
The increased involvement of the state suggests the significance of this industry to 
the larger national economy.  
 It was not long before Singapore became the commercial capital of the free 
port trading system (Wong 1978). Within fifty years, Singapore managed to establish 
itself as an important nodal point for trade between SEA and other regions. Asians 
were beginning to expand their trade beyond the familiar neighbouring regions, thus 
elevating Singapore’s status both locally and internationally. This facilitation of 
international trade involved Chinese workers yet again; many Chinese positioned 
themselves as middlemen or compradors who worked for foreign corporations who 
bought and sold products such as tea or cotton, on behalf of the company. The 
comprador system thus complemented the entrepôt trade and contributed to the rise 
of Singapore’s port revenue.  
International migration stalled during WW2 and shortly after, the Chinese 
Communist (CCP) Party came into power in China. During this time, the country 
was governed with principles such as the communist ideology of ‘domestic 
construction and self-production’ (Wei 2010: 32), which forbade migration. This 
meant migrating was impossible for the Chinese people. As a country, China was 





3.3 Nation-Building Years: Traditional, Non-Traditional, Skilled and Unskilled 
Immigrant Labour 
  Singapore’s nation-building years saw continual streams of Chinese 
immigrants. Chinese immigrant labour continued to be vital but unlike the 
intermediary role during the colonial era, they now occupied positions at the top or 
bottom rungs of society – skilled or unskilled labour.  Around the time of 
independence starting in 1965, foreign labour was imperative to the functioning of 
Singapore. Singapore focused its resources on building the nation by augmenting the 
labour force through an influx of foreign labour. Foreign labour was vital given that 
Singapore faced a labour shortage. The state deemed foreign labour not only 
necessary, but beneficial for its ability to stimulate entrepreneurial activities (Pang 
and Lim 1982: 551). Immigrant labour was especially necessary in the 1960s-1970s 
as Singapore articulated ambitious economic agendas but yet, faced a labour 
shortage. To mitigate this, authorities implemented pro-immigration policies around 
1968 (Pang and Lim 1982: 549).  
 As the economy grew, the demand for labour continued to mount. The labour 
shortage was most keenly felt in the manufacturing, shipbuilding and construction 
industries. However, the global recession in 1974/5 dampened the immigrant labour 
growth but it was not long before Singapore recovered and resumed its economic 
development initiatives. In 1978, the burgeoning construction industry created 
demands for foreign labour and it was then that Singapore diversified its immigrant 
intake. On top of the “traditional” sources such as Peninsular Malaysia, many 
immigrants were recruited from “non-traditional” sources which included Indonesia, 




this period saw a proliferation of immigrants and immigrant sources. In 1980s, the 
demand for labour spiked yet again; in fact, demand was so great that the authorities 
moved towards a liberal stance and “decided to liberalise for two years the 
importation of all, skilled and unskilled foreign workers from both traditional and 
non-traditional sources (Pang and Lim 1982: 550)”. In addition, the authorities 
simplified the application processes so as to ease recruitment of foreign labour.  All 
these were done to reduce entry barriers to working in Singapore. Evidently, the 
years of nation-building generated a large demand for immigrant labour and since 
then, skilled immigrants have been a constant fixture in Singapore’s immigration 
policy. These groups of immigrants are transnational professionals and 
entrepreneurs, many of whom are “wealthy Chinese from Malaysia, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, Indonesia, and other Southeast Asian countries (Pang and Lim 1982: 549).” 
This reliance on immigrant labour continues till today (Yap 1999).  
 
3.4 Post - 1978 Migration from China: Market-Led Global Economy 
The changing political economy of China was the next significant event. This 
occurred in latter parts of 1978, when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
reoriented their plans towards a “socialist modernisation” (Skeldon 1996: 434). 
When Deng Xiaoping came into power, he pursued a market-led economy. Key to 
this was the economic liberation of China; under this new paradigm, policies such as 
the acceptance of foreign capital and the relaxation of emigration laws were 
introduced. This liberalised migration law. For example, the “Law on the Control of 
the Exit and Entry of Citizens” was instituted and took effect from 1986 onwards. 




into the country and exit from the country, which were rights previously denied 
under the previous regime. To support China’s changing political economy, travel 
was relaxed in the early 1980s and people began to leave permanently and 
temporarily for a wide range of reasons. Some estimates suggest that 350,000 
Chinese citizens went overseas between 1979 and 1985 (Liu 2005: 29-316). In short, 
international migration became a right of Chinese citizens.  
Over the decades, the law pertaining to migration was further revised in 
favour of mobility for the people. In September 1985, the People’s Congress issued 
identification cards which facilitated the movements of citizens. Later, in November 
1985, ‘the regulation concerning Chinese citizens going abroad and returning’ was 
promulgated, thus declaring overseas travel as a basic right. Specific emigration and 
immigration laws were adopted which granted Chinese citizens the right to travel 
outside of China and leave for private reasons (Skeldon 1996). This differed from the 
past whereby travel was endorsed only for official reasons. This effectively increased 
the volume and complexity of migration because Chinese citizens could now travel 
for various personal purposes. Moreover, in February 2002, Chinese citizens no 
longer had to submit a foreign invitation nor did they need to obtain approval from 
the local Public Security Bureau before going abroad. At the same time, destination 
countries were also relaxing regulation towards Asian immigrants (Liu 2005: 297). 
Along with these legal changes, economic development soared and created mobile 
populations within China. These mobile populations include a wide range of groups 
including professionals, students, study mothers, sporting and artistic talent to name 
a few categories. At the same time, China continues to provide low-skilled labour. 
The overall rate of immigration thus increased and the composition of immigrants 





The Rise of the Chinese Professional Class 
As a result of the confluence of an increasingly liberal China and the 
emerging tiger economies, China experienced a new type of business-oriented 
migration involving the relocation of families and educated/skilled people. The 
relatively affluent areas of Fujian, Zhejiang and Guangdong were unsurprisingly the 
major migrant sending areas, given their history of being the economic centres of 
China. Even so, Southern China continues to export lesser-skilled labour today. 
International students also constitute one significant group of Chinese immigrants. 
Since 1978, “more than 1.2 million students have left China to study abroad”. 
Around 30 years later in 2007, “China sent around 144,000 students abroad, 167 
times of the 1978 (Ministry of Education, 5 April 2008 in Wei 2010: 35).” 
Unsurprisingly, this makes China the largest sender of international students in the 
world.   
This post-1980 context of China created a generation of more liberal, 
educated and technologically-savvy people. Studies have found that the 
“composition of the migrant flows has been heavily biased towards the postgraduate-
level student, the professionals and the wealthier groups” (Skeldon 1996: 449). These 
highly educated individuals from China, who emerged at the top of the world’s most 
populous educational system, are sought after by companies and schools around the 
world. At the same time, conditions in China’s major cities remain less favourable to 
them. Ironically, to produce such high-calibre people, China’s education system has 
to be extremely competitive but in the process of doing so, it has produced an 




of many graduates (Bai 2006). These structural factors are disincentives for the 
highly skilled to stay in China and hence, many choose to migrate to countries which 
not only need them more, but are able to provide more economic, social and cultural 
capital. Therefore, the logical trend is to see more Chinese professionals moving 
across the globe for employment purposes.  
 
East Asian Tiger Economies  
 In addition, the liberalisation of China coincided with the rise of the East-
Asian tiger economies, and induced more Chinese emigration especially to these 
economies. I highlight this regional context to argue that a thriving Asian economy 
was the climate in which Chinese migrants were moving to. Most significantly, this 
era paved the way for the rise of mobile professionals from China.  
Around the 1980s, the newly industrialised economies (NIEs) of South 
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore prospered and emerged as strong 
economic competitors to the conventional powerhouses such as the US and parts of 
Europe. This rise of the East-Asian economies has been termed the ‘Asian miracle’ 
(Stiglitz and Uy 1996) because of their rise to economic prominence in such a short 
span of time. Japan led this regional growth and its success occurred much earlier 
than the other four countries. What then are the features of these exceptional East 
Asian economies? Kuznet (1988: S17-S19) suggests that the economies of Japan, 
Taiwan and South Korea share similar traits. They have high rates of investments, 
competitive labour markets, high export rates, small public sectors, little welfare 
expenditure and some form of government intervention in the economy. Incidentally, 




‘East Asian model of economic development’, Kuznet excludes Singapore and Hong 
Kong on the account that they did not have an agricultural sector and hence, faced 
economic issues of a different kind. However, Kuznet, as with most other analysts, 
agree that Hong Kong and Singapore are part of the larger East Asian economic 
boom. These two economies share those traits as well but differ slightly regarding 
the degree of government intervention in the economy. In his comparative analysis, 
Krause (1988: S60) argues that the Singapore government opted for a more involved 
stance than that of Hong Kong. Barring the different degrees of state intervention, 
these economies did experience similar developmental trajectories. From the 1980s, 
these economies have had exceptional GDP growth rates and continue to be vibrant 
economies even in today’s climate when the global economy is slowing down.   
 
The Developmental State of Singapore 
 The most significant difference between the governments of the colonial 
period and that of the post-independence period in Singapore is this: while the British 
adopted a laissez-faire approach, the Singapore government was highly involved in 
the development of the state. I use the concept ‘developmental state’ (Chalmers 
1982) to explain the role of the Singapore government, especially from the 1980s 
onwards. The transition from the colonial to the post-independence period changed 
migration patterns: while migrants were allowed to come into Singapore during the 
colonial period, the post-independence era saw the government actively pursuing 
foreign talent.  
This concept of the developmental state was first used in the context of East 
Asian economic development in the 20
th




economic planning and intervention. Chalmers Johnson (1982) first coined the term 
with reference to the Japanese economy. To briefly summarise his propositions, he 
argues that developmentalism is characteristed by several traits: first, states which 
are developmentalist in its orientation consistently prioritise economic development. 
Second, states are involved in private property and the economy. Third, state 
initiatives are guided by an elite economic bureaucracy. Fourth, this management is 
simultaneously involved in consultations and collaborations with the private sector. 
All these efforts contribute to policy formulation. Finally, there is a distinction 
between state bureaucrats who execute these ideas and politicians who oversee them.  
Following these arguments, Singapore has undoubtedly been a developmental 
state from the time of its independence (Perry, Kong and Yeoh 1997). I suggest two 
main reasons. First, the state wielded immense political control over a range of 
national issues such as immigration and its impacts on labour market restructuring, 
education and urban planning to name a few (Olds and Yeung 2004: 512-513). State 
organisations are arranged hierarchically such as any form of national change is 
influenced by the state, with minimal, if any, citizen involvement. Second, as a 
logical consequence, through a series of programmes, the state controlled and 
sustained economic growth. Pereira (2008) notes some of these initiatives. In the 
1980s, there was a new economic policy called the Industrial Upgrading Programme. 
This programme had the intention of encouraging the move towards high technology 
jobs, which would inevitably drive Singapore up the value-chain. Also in the 1980s, 
government-linked corporations (GLCs) were formed. Under this new system the 
state became involved as the largest stakeholder, in the key sectors such as 
telecommunications, airline and shipbuilding sectors. Later on, in the 1990s, 




regionalisation strategy, which saw the state pursuing economic opportunities in 
China and neighbouring countries. The agenda was to stimulate external growth in 
order to supplement domestic progress (Peirera 2008: 1193). Taken together, these 
examples show that the 20
th
 century climate was evidently one of pro-growth. 
Examples of state entrepreneurship include the construction of the regional industrial 
parks in Batam and Suzhou (Pereira 2004).  
 However, developmentalism continued unabated even after the 
industrialisation period of the 1980s – 1990s. In the 21st Century, the state has 
explicitly boosted the biotechnology sector, a highly lucrative sector which has yet to 
be fully developed. In addition, in anticipation of a declining manufacturing sector, 
the state has also channelled workers from the manufacturing to the service sectors 
(Pereira 2008). Together, these initiatives clearly show the sustained interest in state-
led economic growth. After all, Singapore’s economic success in the 1980s was large 
state-induced, and till today, the state continues to drive economic agendas.  
Therefore, Singapore has very coherent plans for developmentalism. Within 
this framework, is a pro-immigration stance, which welcomes foreign labour into the 
country with the hopes of having them further stimulate the economy, and to mitigate 
the population issue of a declining workforce triggered by low fertility and ageing.  
 
3.5 Summary 
 The chapter shows that the patterns of Chinese migration have evolved 
through the decades. First, patterns of Chinese migration were previously 




education levels have enabled many Chinese to seek opportunities elsewhere. The 
modern day immigrant does not only refer to the highly educated but also the less 
educated who are keen on exploring overseas employment. Unlike the uneducated 
immigrants of the past, migrants today work under much more regulated conditions. 
Most importantly, migration is usually voluntary. Second, Chinese migration 
networks and Chinese ethnic ties are key themes through these historical phases. 
While migration was often based on kinship or ethnic relations in the past, the shift 
from the colonial context clearly shows the declining reliance on these strong ethnic 
ties. Finally, the transition from the colonial economy to a market-led economy, and 
currently to a globalised economy today is critical to understanding the patterns of 
contemporary Chinese migration. In all these various stages, Chinese workers 
migrated for different purposes and through various means. In comparing these 
stages, I have shown that Chinese recruitment, employment and migration patterns 
were concentrated in various ethnic clusters in the colonial era, but this has started to 
change from 1978 onwards, when China became more receptive to global influences. 





GLOBALISATION AND ‘NEW’ CHINESE IMMIGRATION  
In this chapter, I describe ‘new Chinese immigrants’ in the 21st Century, the 
age of globalisation. I argue that the traits they possess are generalizable across 
various case studies from many countries, and thus, the idea of ‘new’ needs to be 
unpacked. Therefore, I problematize ‘new’ in two ways using the context of 
Singapore: first, if new Chinese immigrations are appearing in many parts of the 
world, what is distinct about them appearing in Singapore? In some sense, there is 
after all nothing ‘new’ about this phenomenon on a global level. Second, given the 
long history of Chinese immigration to Singapore, Chinese migration is anything but 
new. However, I suggest that immigration trends today are ‘new’ because a) there is 
a new context of migration and b) a new diversity amongst Chinese immigrants.  
 
4.1 Growth of Asian Migration 
There is a new context in migration research. In recent years, migration 
research has given attention to Asian migration. Although migration to and from 
Asia is not a new phenomenon, the unprecedented scale and diversity (Hugo 2005) 
today has ignited discussions on new economic, political and socio-cultural 
consequences in the region. Moreover, the region constitutes several countries which 
have the leading immigrant populations. Following Figure 11, they are Macau, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, and Brunei with 66.1%, 39.4%, 33.6% and 31.7% immigrant 






Figure 10: Asia: Migrant population of 2000 (United Nations 2002 cited in Hugo 2005: 95) 
Today, as Western economies experience a decline, Asia is increasingly 
becoming a popular and practical destination for Chinese immigrants. As of 2010, 
Asia houses around 28 million overseas Chinese or eighty per cent of the total 
Chinese diasporas in the world (Wei 2010: 35). Incidentally, China is the largest 
migrant-sending country. According to the International Organisation for Migration 
(IOM 2003), there are 350 million Chinese living abroad who constitute 18% of the 
total migrants globally. This scale of emigration is possible due to policies within 
China which are gradually more accommodating towards migration. In contrast to 
policies in the past which restricted immigration, those today take on a more neutral 
stance (Xiang 2003); Xiang suggests that migration has been shifted to the 
commercial realm, and in so doing, the authorities have successfully neutralised the 




with ideological and political issues, and this creates an environment more 
favourable for immigration. In addition, there is the institutionalisation and the 
commercialisation of migration. Through fairs and conventions, potential immigrants 
are cognizant of opportunities that can be found overseas, and have institutional 
guidance to act upon them. At the same time, they have forged new relationships 
with the overseas Chinese communities and receiving countries, thereby signalling 
their intent to support the movement of talent and labour between China and various 
countries. Under these conditions, China emerges as the top-sending migrant 
country.  
 
4.2 Chinese Migration in the Global Economy 
 The context of globalisation readily enables the movement of labour across 
borders. This, coupled with China’s liberalisation, produces political and economic 
ties which promote the export of Chinese labour. Under these conditions, Chinese 
labour migration/labour export takes an accelerated and unprecedented form.  
 
Organised Labour Export and Increased Trade  
From the late 1970s, the Chinese economy became more internationally-
oriented and dynamic. Liu (1995: 299) argues that this triggered a ‘dynamic 
population movement’ in China; people within China are more able to move about 
both internally and externally, and since it happened on a large scale, significant 
population changes have been observed. The new Chinese climate fuels emigration 




labour export is defined as: contracted projects and labour services (Liu 1995: 302).” 
As labour is able to move relatively freely, the export labour market in China grows, 
and organised labour export becomes a key channel for Chinese migration.  
 
Figure 11: Organised Labour Export Statistics, 1984-1993 ( Liu 1995: 302) 
Figure 12 shows that China, at the onset of contemporary globalisation in the 1980s 
and 1990s, had increased the number of contracted countries/regions by more than 
three times in the span of eleven years. Evidently, the climate of globalisation has 
triggered trade and emigration in the form of organised labour export. This process is 
a highly institutionalised process involving governments and businesses: national 
government corporations, local government companies, and trading companies (Liu 
1995: 302).” Ultimately, labour export serves to earn foreign exchange and 




economies are shifting their focus to advanced producer services, the manufacturing 
capabilities of the Chinese workforce is in high demand.  
 More recently, students consist of a growing group of immigrants. These 
student-migrations are typically sponsored by either state or firms. In fact, this kind 
of migration is highly structured and possesses an organised system, with specific 
streams of people moving to specific places. For example, Singapore and Hong 
Kong, are receptive to university-educated Chinese workers, and Singapore is 
particularly willing to accept firm-sponsored Chinese students who received their 
education in Singapore (Liu 1995: 302). With institutional support from both sending 
and receiving countries, this trend continues to grow. According to reports, in 2008 
alone, China sent 179, 800 students abroad, making them the largest source country 
of international students (Ministry of Education 2009 cited in Xiang and Wei 2009: 
515). To add on, another government report indicates that the top destinations for 
Chinese students in 2005 were the Americas (32.1%), Europe (27.9%) and Asia 
(25.3%) (Chinese Ministry of Education Annual Work Report cited in Xiang and 
Wei 2009: 515). Enrolment in Asia looks set to grow (EDB 2003; Mok 2008; 
Cheung, Yuen, Yuen and Yin 2011). Singapore in particular, looks set to increase its 
population of international students in order to address its objective of becoming a 
global educational hub (Duhamel 2004; Olds 2007). Putting the two trends together, 
this can only mean that the numbers of Chinese students will continue to rise, and 
more of them will be directed towards Singapore.  
Apart from students, Singapore has been taking in a sizeable pool of 
immigrant labour ranging from the highly skilled professionals and elite investors to 




policies; recent figures (Figure 13) on economic cooperation reveal a growing 
economic relationship between Singapore and China. The steady growth in the value 
of ‘Labour Services’ reflects the influx of immigrants into Singapore from 2005 – 
2010 (Figure 14). This period has the highest net migration rate in the last sixty 
years. 
 








































Figure 13: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United 
Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision, 
http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm 
From workers to students to professionals, this expansion of export labour is made 
possible due to the coincidence of two contexts: the liberalisation of China which has 
eased cross-border movements, and the globalisation of the economy which presents 





4.3 New Chinese Immigrants in Japan, South Africa, Canada and Europe 
What then are the characteristics of these new immigrants? The globalising 
and liberalising conditions of China means that from the first half of the 20
th
 
Century, new immigrants have been appearing in many parts of the world. The 
literature typically points towards the 1980s as the phase which saw the influx of 
Chinese to new areas. Compared to their predecessors, these new immigrants are 
superior in terms of educational and socio-economic levels. Perhaps as a result of 
their elevated statuses today, they are also more willing to integrate and settle in host 
societies. Amongst Chinese newcomers in Japan, a majority could be counted middle 
class (Le Bail 2005) and many are more integrated than their predecessors in terms 
of economic and residential patterns. The ‘new immigrants’ here refers to those 
immigrating to Japan from the 1970s onwards. Relatedly, the ‘old’ immigrant refers 
to those present in Japan from 1945 to 1970s. Amongst new immigrants are students 
and professionals, who account for the increased educational and socio-economic 
levels of migrants. However, new immigrants are not necessarily always more 
educated. The inverse trend is found in South Africa. Before 2000, and especially 
around the 1980s, there were many professionals from Beijing and Shanghai in South 
Africa. Today however, a less affluent group constitute the Chinese group: they are 
mainly small traders and peasants from the Fujian province (Huynh and Park 2011: 
289). Many of these migrants struggle to make a living. 
 
Transnationalism 
However, what is distinctively new is the transnational orientations of new 




move several times during the course of their careers/lives. This transnational 
perspective unravels another new aspect of Chinese migration: due to the diverse 
nature of migration today, there is a multitude of differences amongst Chinese 
immigrants. Huynh and Park term this the “nuances of Chinese identities (2011: 
301)”. Due to immense differences caused by various transnational immigrant 
pathways, it is not unusual to observe tensions between groups of Chinese. This 
debunks the myth of the ‘Chinese mass’ and suggests that the Chinese immigrant 
population is increasingly heterogeneous.  This heterogeneity is likewise evident in 
Canada. For many years now, Canada has been a primary destination for Chinese 
immigrants. These immigrants initially worked in major sectors such as 
manufacturing or services but have overtime, gained employment in niche areas: in 
the 1980s, many were in primary industries but by the mid-1990s, the Chinese began 
to migrate due to opportunities in Applied Sciences (Guo and DeVoretz 2007: 8). 
Migrant groups today are evidently more varied in terms of their skill sets.  
 
Diversification 
One major implication of these new traits is the ‘diversification’ of 
immigrants in the globalised migration context (Giese 2003). Due to the diverse 
backgrounds, orientations and patterns, immigrants are loosely connected to each 
other. Contemporary Chinese migration to Germany brings across this point clear: 
due to the emergence of new migration systems and institutions, the process of 
migrating is “anything but homogenous”. First, new immigrants are also more 
geographically dispersed than before. In Europe, Chinese immigrants are exploring 




labourers, peddlers and traders (Pieke 2002: 7). Western Europe was the region with 
the most Chinese immigrants by the end of WW2 but over the decades, the Chinese 
communities spread across Europe. They settled in Northern Europe, and also in new 
destinations such as Southern and Eastern Europe from the 1980s and 1990s 
respectively (Pieke 2002: 6). Pieke (2002: 16) identifies three new regions which are 
new destinations for Chinese immigrants in Europe today. The first is Central and 
Eastern Europe. These areas have traditionally been areas with a low density of 
ethnic Chinese, unlike the current post-socialist economy which involves a high 
demand of goods and services, which are industries that immigrants from China have 
expertise in. Second, in Southern Europe, Italy (from the 1980s) is fast becoming a 
popular place for Chinese immigrants; they are mainly found in garment and leather 
workshops but are increasingly prominent in capital-intensive businesses. This 
pattern of Chinese diffusion is emerging in Spain, Portugal and Greece as well (Pieke 
2002: 18). Finally, the Chinese continue to appear in Western Europe but apart from 
the traditional destinations of Netherlands, England and France, they are also moving 
to newer territories such as Belgium, Germany, Austria, Switzerland and the Nordic 
countries. 
 
Professionalization of Emigration and Loose Networks 
This widespread diffusion of the Chinese population across the world is made 
possible, in part, due to the “professionalization of emigration”. Pieke (2002: 12) 
defines the phrase as making “emigration universally available in overseas Chinese 
home areas and opening up previously inaccessible destinations.” Using the case of 




from the 1980s enabled waves of emigration from across China. In particular, three 
distinct groups of Chinese established bases in Europe (Pieke 2002: 8-9). They were 
the Zhejiangese, Cantonese and Hakka, and the South-East Asian Chinese. Within 
these groups, there are few commonalities as they came from different regions, had 
their own dialects and cultures and arrived ‘independently’ from each other.  These 
‘independent’ migration streams were possible in part due to the presence of 
recruitment services.  
This new wave of Chinese migration demonstrates a more varied pattern of 
migration, and concomitantly, the declining trend of chain migration. The 
Zhejiangese for instance, have traditionally exemplified the chain migration pattern - 
the dependence of kinship and/or friendship networks in the pursuit of emigration- 
which has explained the presence of the Zhejiang community in Netherlands, 
Belgium, Germany and France (Pieke 2002: 11). Recently however, the Chinese are 
leveraging on entrepreneurial opportunities as a means of emigration and venturing 
into Scandinavia, Italy, Switzerland, Austria, Spain and Portugal for business 
purposes. A similar pattern of dispersed networks is evident amongst the Chinese in 
Germany (Giese 2003). Immigrants are “loosely connected” (2003: 179) and as a 
community, they are fragmented and polarised along occupational, educational, 
economic, cultural and ethnic lines. In sum, this idea counterpoises the view that old 
Chinese migration was largely driven by ethnic communities and that it was reliant 
on closely-knitted Chinese communities and strong networks (Zhao 2008). Today, 
Chinese immigrants in Europe and elsewhere are geographically diffused, 





4.4 New Chinese Immigrants in Singapore: New Diversity 
The case of Singapore exhibits the above characteristic. Chinese immigrants 
are transnational in their orientations. This departs from patterns which Wang (1993) 
articulates; while he describes uni-linear movements amongst the Chinese between 
home and host country, migration today sprouts from various points, results in 
several destinations and includes regular shuttling between places. This is also 
known by scholars as the transnational turn in the migration literature (Faist 2004; 
Levitt and Jaworsky 2007). Transnationalism manifests itself in two ways. First, 
there is an influx of immigrants as people become more mobile. Migration patterns 
reveal that the recent influx of immigrants began around 1990. Estimates (UNDP 
2010) suggest that 1995-2000 and 2005-2010 are periods with the highest migration 
rates – 13.7 and 30.9 respectively (Figure 14). There has evidently been an 
unprecedented pace of immigration in recent years.  
In addition, the transnational climate has inevitably encouraged larger 
volumes of migration. Another expression of transnationalism is seen in large 
increase in the numbers of Permanent Residents (PRs) who reside both in Singapore 
and in other countries. The Singapore Census (Singapore Department of Statistics 
2010: 40) shows that between the years 1990 and 2009, the number of citizens, 
Permanent Residents (PR) and Non-Residents (NR) increased by 18%, 79% and 
75.2% respectively (Figure 15). NRs include people who are neither citizens nor 
PRs. So while there has been a large increase of the PRs and NRs, who are 
transmigrants and who move amongst cities to find jobs, this does not translate into 




Singapore attracts many migrants but a sizeable proportion does not stay on, and 
choose instead, to be transnational in their citizenship orientations.  
 





Chinese immigration to Singapore today is more diverse in character. Given 
that globalisation of transportation and communications have made cross-border 
travel options prevalent, the departure points of immigrants are now extremely 
varied. While earlier immigrants came primarily from the southern regions of China 
such as Fujian and Guangdong (Freedman 1960: 26), the sources today are 
geographically more dispersed, thus generating a highly varied pool of immigrants in 
Singapore. Many professionals from developed cities such as Beijing, Shanghai and 
Shenzhen, are working in Singapore. However, this trend occurs alongside the 
consistent and traditional inflow from the southern regions. In addition, there is a 
new and growing population originating from north-eastern parts of China, but little 
research has been done on this group. Given that the different regions of China are 
associated with their own distinct ethnicities, languages/dialects, cultures and socio-
economic statuses, the Chinese immigrant population today is invariably more 
differentiated.  
 
Occupational Groups, Skills and Industries 
Diverse backgrounds translate into a range of occupations amongst 
immigrations. The historian Wang Gung Wu notes that Chinese migrants have 
dominated different occupational roles throughout two centuries (in Hirschman 1998: 
23-24). Before the 19th Century, they were mostly “merchants and sojourners” who 
ventured abroad for economic reasons. From the middle of the 19th Century, there 
were many Chinese “coolies and labourers” who were often socio-economically 
impoverished (Freedman 1960: 26). From the 20th Century onwards, Chinese 




Respectively, these three migrant conceptualisations correspond to Wang’s (in Jones 
2010: 348) notions of Chinese migration patterns of the “trader pattern” (Hua 
Shang), the “coolie pattern” (Hua Gong) and the “sojourner pattern” (Hua Qiao). 
Today, Chinese immigrants are typically ‘transnational’ in their orientations - they 
are mobile and have settlement patterns which are less predictable. Singapore has 
been home to a range of Chinese immigrants – from labourers to professionals to 
special talents in arts and sports (Straits Times, 22 November 2008).  This wide pool 
of immigrants changed the demographics of Chinese immigrants in Singapore. 
Many Chinese immigrants are attracted to Singapore for employment 
purposes; this interest has become more differentiated and a more varied pool of 
immigrants is moving to Singapore. While not entirely new to Singapore, the group 
of new skilled workers has expanded exponentially in recent years, particularly from 
2005 onwards (Hing, Lee and Sheng 2009). Chinese professionals and skilled 
workers from top-tier cities constitute a new and growing group today. Apart from 
growth in numbers, they are also growing in status. Being young and upwardly 
mobile, they are targets of the Singapore government’s campaign to augment its 
population. One media report terms this group the “young dragons” (Leong 2008), 
which emphasizes their youth and ambition; unlike the previous generation these 
new immigrants are “younger”, more “well-educated”, “speak competent English”. 
With these capabilities, they now work in fields –such as art and writing - which 
their predecessors were not involved in due to linguistic barriers.  
Nevertheless, many continue to persist in conventional Chinese fields such as 
“entrepreneurship” and “IT”. In addition, within this group of new immigrants, there 




the people who follow a trajectory of “stepwise international migration” (Paul 2011), 
which means that they are likely to uproot for greener pastures someday (Leong 
2008). There is yet another group who prefers to stay on in Singapore and take on 
citizenship or permanent residence. Either way, their abilities, whether to emigrate 
elsewhere or to stay on in Singapore, attest to the calibre of these “white collar 
professionals from China” (Lee 2011) – they are globally competitive and thus well-
equipped to match up with locals in the workforce. However, there is still a dearth of 
research on this group of new immigrants. 
At the other end of the spectrum, Singapore continues to attract lesser-skilled 
migrants as it did in the past. These new unskilled workers are typically found in 
construction, manufacturing, maritime and service industries in Singapore (Lin 
2010). In fact, Singapore has received so many of such workers that this issue has 
been a point of contention in recent months as locals view them as threats to local 
jobs. Stereotypical reasoning suggest that the unskilled local population is either 
being supplanted by cheaper and younger Chinese labour or have their wages 
depressed due to a sheer volume of foreign labour. As one journalist puts it (Chen 
2008), this is “Singapore’s unloved Chinese labour boom” for as essential as they are 
to the local economy, they are not necessarily well-received. It is thus not the case 
that favourable immigration conditions in Singapore translate into positive outcomes 
for workers; in fact, it is quite the opposite as many unskilled workers are 
disadvantaged and face a plethora of labour problems despite being in a pro-
immigration climate in Singapore. These problems often involve agents and occur on 
both the origin and destinations sites of migration, perhaps as Lin (2010: 207-209) 
suggests, due to the emigration system of China and the immigration system of 




coordinated and thus expose loopholes which labour agents exploit. Lesser skilled 
Chinese workers often lack knowledge on various procedures and together with their 
lack of proficiency in English language, they are susceptible to being exploited by 
shady agents. Issues include the lack of transparency over salary, an arbitrary down-
payment for finding employment in Singapore (Lin 2010: 201-204). On a personal 
level, many migrants –especially construction workers- experience psychological and 
emotional difficulties (Low, Liu and Soh 2008). These issues have strengthened the 
cause of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) which has typically highlighted 
human rights issues that accompany the influx of Chinese labour (Chan 2011; 
HOME 2011). Overall, Chinese workers today are spread out across various 
industries, unlike their predecessors who were largely confined to manual labour.  
Macro-economic Trends of Foreign Labour 
In addition to a numerical change, there also exists a qualitative change in the 
composition of Chinese labour. Specifically, there are new sending-cities and new 
labour export patterns. Chinese workers today are originating from more varied 
sources apart from the Southern cities which have been traditional sources of labour 
(Chan 2011). Historically, foreign labour to Singapore had originated from Southern 
China. The southern coastal cities were for a long time, more developed and 
connected, thus able to produce relevant workers and the channels for them to move 
abroad. At present however, many northern cities are becoming new sources of 
labour. This might be due to the fact that as China develops and opportunities 
proliferate within the country, many people from developed Chinese cities either stay 
put or choose to migrate within China. As competition becomes stiffer, potential 




China. However, research on these emerging source cities remains limited.  The 
illustration below (Figure 16) shows estimated figures. It shows the provinces which 
send the highest number of workers overseas through labour cooperation companies 
and international contractors (in 2007). The figures suggest that the following cities 
are becoming major sending-area: Shandong sends out 35, 445 migrants/year, 
Jiangsu sends 25, 973 migrants/year, Liaoning sends 25, 290 migrants/year and 
Henan sends 11, 986 migrants/year. The labour export of these northern cities 
surpass traditional source areas such as Fujian which sends 20, 288 migrants/year 
and Guangzhou which sends 9, 719 migrants/year. These southern cities have 
previously dominated Chinese labour in South East Asia.  There is evidently, an 
expansion of labour sources; while the southern cities dominated in the past, it 
appears that many northern cities are dominating labour exports today.  
 
Figure 15: Provinces sending the highest number of workers overseas through labour cooperation 




The construction industry in particular, is one which benefits from the huge 
pool of China foreign labour. This trend of Chinese labour working in the 
construction industry in Singapore started during the 1980s construction boom, but 
has since become a more generalised trend with Chinese workers found across many 
industries today. At present, construction, manufacturing, maritime and services are 
largely dependent on foreign workers from China (Lin 2010: 194). Chan (2011: 13) 
notes: “According to China’s Ministry of Commerce, as of 2007, there were about 
100,000 Chinese workers employed on work permit in Singapore, mainly in 
construction (42.8 per cent), manufacturing (32.4 per cent) and transportation (8.9 
per cent).” In addition, most Chinese workers in Singapore are non-professionals 
who hold labour-intensive jobs (Chan 2011: 11).  
The sizeable pool of Chinese labour in Singapore generates large amounts of 
revenue in terms of the total contract value. One estimate states (Chan 2011: 5):  
“In 2008, the total contract value of China’s labour export to 
Singapore was US527 million, making it the second most valuable 




Figure 16: Export Labour Service in China (cited in Chan 2011: 9) 
Labour export from China evidently has relevance on bilateral trade and economic 
development in Singapore. These macro-economic trends shape the socio-political 
policies which allow or disallow migrants to work here. In addition, these trends in 
turn confirm the increasing prevalence of Chinese workers abroad. Chinese 
immigration, particularly for work purposes, is growing. Migrants are also more 
widespread as destinations are increasingly diverse. 
 
Gender and Age 
 Gender and age of immigrants are also increasingly diverse, and this sets new 
immigrants apart from their predecessors. Recently, the entry of migrant brides and 
later study mothers (‘Peidu Mama’) highlight the prevalence of female immigrants 
(Huang and Yeoh 2005) as opposed to male coolies in the past. Since mainlanders 
are migrating for educational purposes in additional to labour opportunities, the age 
compositions have become more varied; Mainland-students attend schools in 




age groups. It was only recently that the trend of study mothers (‘Pei Du Mamas’3) 
started in Singapore. These mothers accompany their young children to Singapore 
for years and in so doing, put their career projects are put on hold during this 
duration (Huang and Yeoh 2005). In addition to study mothers, another fairly new 
group of Chinese immigrants are the Chinese brides who enter Singapore via 
marriage migration. The persistently low fertility rate in Singapore, together with an 
increase in the average age of first marriage, has fuelled international marriages. By 
this, I refer to the rise in the number of marriages between locals and foreigners. One 
significant group is that of Chinese brides; Zhong (2010: 8) notes that the inflow of 
foreign brides is a growing phenomenon as statistics from international marriages 
from 2003 and 2010 show that this pattern is steadily strengthening (Zhong 2010: 6). 
The phenomenon of international marriage is a highly gendered phenomenon as there 
are significantly more brides than grooms entering Singapore for the purpose of 
marriage.  
 Taking all these characteristics together, the interviewees in this study reflect 
this new diversity which I have described. They vary in terms of their places of 
origin, age, occupation and gender (refer to Chapter Two, Figure 5).  
 
4.5 Summary 
In this chapter, I demonstrate that China’s involvement in the global economy 
from the 1980s onwards has triggered new migration patterns. Chinese immigrants 
                                                 
3
 This refers to women who accompany their children overseas for studies -usually for primary level 




today certainly possess characteristics which their predecessors did not. They are 
more diverse and hence, produce more varied migration patterns. Unlike old Chinese 
migration, it is less common to observe Chinese migration today being initiated and 
sustained by familial ties, nor is it likely to see the Chinese congregating in specific 
geographical areas or industries. There is a new diversity amongst Chinese 
immigrants. However, by making mention of case studies from many regions, I also 
ascertain that new Chinese migration applies to many contexts outside of Singapore. 





NEW NETWORK DYNAMICS:  
TOWARDS INSTITUTIONALISED NETWORKS  
The question then remains: what is new about new Chinese immigration in 
Singapore? Going beyond the descriptive exercise of immigrant profiling, this 
chapter suggests that there are changes in the ways migration networks operate today 
– there are new network dynamics. To elaborate on this argument, first, I present a 
critique of the established model of migration networks: while Massey’s 
conceptualisation of migration networks has been fundamental in many works on 
immigration, the globalising conditions of today have reshaped network dynamics. 
Specifically, there is an increased reliance on institutional networks and a 
concomitant decrease in the reliance on personal networks in the migration 
processes. Migration networks are therefore moving away from ethnic and familial 
bases of origin to more institutionalised ones; specifically, the social organisation of 
Chinese migration is becoming more institutionalised and commercialised. 
Consequently and second, this is a new mechanism in the migration process as it 
causes a shift from the former social organisation of Chinese immigration. Together, 
these changes are what I term the ‘new network dynamics’. However, I maintain that 
ethnic and familial ties remain crucial, but are less apparent today as networks are 
increasingly ordered along institutional lines. In other words, ethnic and familial ties 





5.1 Evolving Contexts and the Shift towards ‘Weak Institutional Networks’ 
This chapter discusses the evolving social organisations of Chinese 
immigration: it has evolved from one that was concentrated to one that is presently 
diffused. Personal networks in the form of kinship, friendship and community ties 
are increasingly less apparent pillars of support for immigrants. More common 
support networks come in the form of commercial agencies, migrant organisations 
and alumni institutions. This departure from traditional migration networks suggests 
that the social bases of migration networks are changing; while I argue that they are 
increasingly institutionalised, I maintain personal networks remain present but are 
increasingly connected to institutional settings. The decision to focus on networks 
stems from the recognition that networks are significant in migration processes 
because they transmit information. According to Castells (2006), networks form the 
basic unit of society; he refers specifically to social and media networks which carry 
useful information to be used to sustain social behaviour. More importantly, Castells 
states that network density is lower in modern day urban society as compared with 
traditional society. Consequently, this means fewer ‘strong ties’ and more ‘weak 
ties’.  
Undergirding this argument is the understanding that migration patterns are 
different under the conditions of the colonial economy vis-à-vis the global economy. 
In the colonial context or the period of old Chinese migration, there were no ICTs 
and only basic transportation networks existed. The lack of infrastructure meant that 
community ties were important because people had no alternatives to communicating 




were of paramount importance to the sustenance of social life. Network density 
during this period was high. With little interaction outside of one’s immediate social 
circle, people understandably established strong ties with local communities. In this 
context, Massey’s model of migration networks proved to be common.  
However, this old social organisation changed with the onset of globalisation 
from the 1980s. In contemporary society, people lead more independent and 
individualistic lives, hence resulting in a network density that is increasingly lower. 
It is thus expected that strong ties are fewer and weak ties are on the rise. Along with 
this, the advent of ICTs further causes a lower network density because people no 
longer have to gather in physical communities for social support; social support 
could be garnered through virtual and transnational ties. Therefore, while personal 
networks continue to exist, they become especially apparent in institutional contexts; 
personal networks are not new but their reliance on institutions is a recent 
development. This evolving social organisation is what I term the ‘new network 
dynamics’, and this forms the basis of chapter six.  
 
5.2 Networks, Institutions and the New Migration Context 
Today, there is prevalent international mobility within Asia. Hugo (2005: 94) 
proffers two explanations: first, is the proliferation of social networks. Migrants 
usually move to places which their predecessors had – this gives them the advantage 
of having social capital assist them in migrating and adapting to local conditions. 
Accordingly, given that more Asians today live outside of their home countries, 
potential emigration destinations are also proliferating. The second reason is the 




institutions involved in moving people across borders.  Examples include “agents, 
recruiters, travel providers, immigration officials etc. who form chains linking Asian 
communities with overseas destinations and are crucial elements in the migration 
system. (Hugo 2005: 94)”. This institutionalisation of migration has made migration 
more convenient and accessible than before. Networks and institutions are thus 
important analytical concepts.  
Yet, networks and institutions are not at all new in migration. Before the 
1800s when transportation networks were far from established, and elaborate 
migration systems were lacking, the importance of personal networks in migration 
was already apparent. In particular, ethnic networks were essential to trade and 
everyday life; Jewish, Chinese and Indian migrant merchant networks shaped the 
European, Southeast Asia and Indian economies (McKeown 2004: 163-164). In 
addition, these networks were critical to socio-cultural developments of that time as 
well. In what follows, I demonstrate that migration networks today are highly 
institutionalised. This development de-emphasizes the element of ethnicity which 
was critical to Chinese migration networks of the past.  
 
5.3 Beyond Personal Networks: Declining Reliance on Personal Networks 
 This empirical section explores my argument that personal networks on their 
own are increasingly less apparent in migration processes, and when they are 
apparent, they often appear in institutional contexts. Following Massey, I 
operationalize ‘personal networks’ as ties between family, friends and community or 
groups bound by ethnic relations (Figure 18).  My data shows that these three types 





Figure 17: Conceptualisation of ‘personal networks’ 
 
Familial Ties: Challenges rather than Resources 
Maintaining familial ties have become more of a challenge, than a resource to 
be tapped on. Many of my respondents do not have family members in Singapore, 
and seldom return home. As a result, they are content with maintaining ties through 
the use of information communication technologies (ICTs). For Chen Wei, not only 
does she not have family networks to tap on while in Singapore, she also struggles to 
keep in touch with people back home. Specifically, her move to Singapore disrupted 
her family life as she missed out on major events. When asked how she keeps in 
touch with her family while in Singapore, she states that the internet is the dominant 
channel of communication. 
“I call, use QQ4 at times but mostly, it is the telephone. But that aside, 
I think if you put yourself in our shoes… it’s quite hard to go back 
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only once in 2 years, and for a short period of time. We usually go 
back in September – and it’s neither the start not the end of the year 
so it’s quite meaningless but I guess, we go since we only get to go 
back once in 2 years.” 
(Chen Wei, Factory Worker, early 20s) 
Moreover, her long periods away from the family add to her detachment from family 
life. Even so, many younger immigrants are technologically-savvy and are able to 
maintain ties with friends and family via internet programmes such as QQ. Sun Yang 
voices similar responses, stating that his lifestyle revolves around long working 
hours and leisure time spent on the internet: 
“Yeah…  It’s usually just working in that one shop. I seldom go out. I 
just use my computer and surf the internet… I use QQ to keep in touch 
with people back home and those working in Singapore too… Anyway 
I rest in the mornings and go to work in the afternoons. When I’m 
free, I go online and surf the web. 
(Sun Yang, Restaurant Worker, Early 20s) 
In contrast, the slightly older immigrants prefer to call home regularly and hardly use 
the internet.  
“In Singapore, the ‘128 Card’ is very convenient. $28 for a card that 
lets me call back to China, and this can last very long… I call home 
every day. This ‘128 Card’ has a 50 days limit… so if you don’t use it, 




(Wei Tian, Coffee Shop Assistant, Late 30s) 
Either way, respondents have found convenient ways to keep in touch with family 
members, and this use of ICTs creates transnational virtual ties for these immigrants 
and their families. These transnational ties suggest that the composition of family 
networks might be changing – it is likely that familial ties today are increasingly not 
closely-knitted networks anchored in a physical space.  
 For some, the family is a source of pressure rather than a source of support. 
This contradicts Massey’s concept of migration networks in which kin and 
community ties provide social and economic resources to immigrants. With these 
evolving familial relations, it is understandable that the resources which 
familial/personal networks used to give are increasingly being provided for by other 
networks. For instance, one respondent sustained unexpected injuries at work and 
consequently, had to stop work for a period of time to undergo surgery.  
“This injury will affect my whole life I think. I want the company to 
pay for it. I don’t have money to pay and I need this operation.” 
(Cao Yuan, Chambermaid, Early 20s) 
Yet, going back to China is not a realistic option to him. He speaks of his reluctance 
to go home due to his failure to live up the expectations of his family and friends:  
“I can’t pay for the air ticket to go home now. Also, it’s hard because, 
I cannot go home empty-handed. You know, I haven’t told my parents 
about this injury and my situation now… I also can’t go home empty-
handed. Ok... in my extended family, there are 7 boys and 8 girls. 




other an architect etc. It gives me pressure, especially when within my 
immediate family, I am the only son. Another reason for coming to 
Singapore is to be independent, to prove that I can survive on my 
own.” 
This work accident has undoubtedly caused him much stress: 
“Now that I am not working, I feel lonely and bored at home. 
Singapore is so small, there are not many places you can go to have 
fun. Also, there is pressure to find a job (but this is not easy because I 
am injured). Now that I am not working, daily expenses becomes a 
concern. My operation will also cause some pain. My family does not 
know about my situation and I don’t want to tell them because I don’t 
want them to worry.” 
For Cao Yuan, the prospect of going home ‘empty-handed’ after borrowing money 
from family and friends to come to Singapore is a daunting one. He feels the need to 
conceal the details of his misfortune, so as not to appear weak to his family members 
in Shandong.  
 In rare instances when the immigrant has a family member in Singapore, it is 
often that the familial ties are ‘weak’ ones. I interpret this as individuals living and 
working separately from family members and keeping in touch only occasionally. 
Sun Yang come from Fujian and works in the F&B industry. While he has an older 
brother working in the construction industry, he admits to being fairly uninvolved in 




“Occasionally only, as he is rather busy. He doesn’t live where I live, 
but lives in Eunos
5.” 
Furthermore, both of them did not come to Singapore together. They came separately 
and relied on middlemen to get jobs in different industries. Evidently then, the 
reliance on familial networks for migration is on the decline. In the first instance, it 
was due to familial pressure and the second example suggests that it might be more 
effective to approach middlemen rather than family members when one is looking 
for a job overseas, because the middlemen channels are more targeted. Also, since 
middlemen are so prevalent today, this becomes a highly accessible channel. 
 
Friendship Ties with Mainland-Chinese: Differentiated and Weak Ties 
Friendship networks amongst Chinese immigrants are also sparse. This is 
unexpected as one would expect that due to the large numbers of Mainlanders in 
Singapore, there would be the formation of several social groups, perhaps defined 
along the lines of origin or dialect. Yet, the inverse is occurring; the presence of 
many Chinese immigrants in Singapore does not necessarily translate into it being 
easier for immigrants to locate a particular community to be affiliated to.  
I attribute this to the ‘new diversity’ amongst immigrant; specifically, the 
many sub-groups within the Mainland-Chinese group make it hard for immigrants to 
find like-minded people. Failing which, this respondent chooses a more isolated 
lifestyle which involves “mostly stay at home” and “working most of the time.” 
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Interestingly, Cao Yuan attends church regularly, but does not have many PRC 
friends in Singapore.  
“China is so big… there are hundreds of cities and we are all 
different. There was a man sitting next to us just now and he was 
speaking in dialect, I can’t understand him unless he speaks 
Mandarin (“Pu Tong Hua”). So we are all very different.” 
Two conditions contribute to this detached lifestyle: the restrictions placed by 
employment agencies and the long working hours. As a respondent explains, many 
factory workers have two off-days a week but are cautious with how they use them 
as agencies have implicit instructions regarding off-days. 
“Before we came, they (agents) told us that we shouldn’t do too many 
things on off days… the agent told us not to do problematic things. 
They say that the regulations in Singapore are as such. So we don’t 
go out too much. Our middlemen were stricter too... he said if we got 
into any trouble, it would implicate him… Our office will tell us the 
same too.” 
(Chen Wei, Factory Worker, Early-20s) 
Given that many of these workers live together, they readily heed this instruction and 
choose to spend more time at home with friends. Furthermore, many non-
professionals are here on contracts and are cautious not to violate any terms in the 
contract lest they be expelled from the company.  
For many lesser-skilled workers, socialising outside of work is rare as the 




contact friends in Singapore, they usually meet up only sporadically. As a respondent 
describes, 
 “Yes, I have friends in Singapore and I can call them every day but if 
there’s nothing much, I don’t call. When I work and there’s nothing 
on at night, I head to Chinatown to buy things. A lot of us head 
there… this place is Zhen Zhu Fan… Next to that there is a coffee 
shop and if you walk further down, there is a Sheng Siong 
supermarket and that is where we meet to buy things. Buy beer and 
all… every time we meet there are about 10 of us, so it’s like a 
gathering.” 
(Wei Tian, Storehouse Worker, Late 30s) 
At best, I suggest that there are some ‘weak’ friendship ties amongst new Chinese 
immigrants. These friendship ties, unlike those of the past, are not necessarily bound 
by clan or dialect associations. Many of these immigrants become acquaintances 
through their jobs in Singapore.  
 In contrast, there is a sense of stronger friendship ties amongst professionals 
who usually get weekends off, and generally more autonomy over their time. 
Professionals are able to establish ties with fellow PRCs quite easily, usually forming 
work or leisure groups. On the subject of social life in Singapore, one respondent 
states that she has “hardly any” Mainland-Chinese friends in Singapore. As a middle-
aged professional, her social circle revolves around her family:  
“We’re too busy so we usually only interact with colleagues. It’s the 




my friends consist of my colleagues or some relatives. For the 
colleagues, it is usually because we hang around school to mark 
papers so we chat a bit. There’s really no time to hang around with 
friends… at best, we have gatherings once a year.  
(Li Mei, Educator, Late 30s) 
Therefore, having weekends free from work does not necessarily translate into 
having more opportunities to socialise. In comparison to old Chinese immigrants, my 
respondents lack familial and community networks, and lead their lives independent 
from social communities. Needless to say, they hardly mention involvement in ethnic 
communities.  
 
Friendship Ties with Singaporeans 
However, is it the case that new immigrants are so well integrated that they 
do not rely much on the immigrant community? Here, I explore the theme of having 
local friends in Singapore. The responses were unanimous: most, regardless of their 
skill levels, do not have local friends and are in fact, disconnected from local 
communities.  Li Mei, a factory worker in her early 20s, attributes this to the lack of 
time and relatedly, the limited opportunities to socialise:  
Interviewer: Do you have a lot of Singaporean friends? 
Li Mei: Hmm not really. It’s ok but not many at all… There’s really 
no time. Even when I meet my friends, it is usually during the school 




at the very most, just to find out how each one is doing. That’s about 
it. There is little leisure time, everything is just so tight.  
Similarly, Zhou Wa discusses his lack of social connections in Singapore:  
Interviewer: do you have friends in Singapore who are Singaporeans? 
Zhou Wa: No, no, no… 
Interviewer: So only the people from China? 
Zhou Wa: Yes… but We rarely meet… 
(Zhou Wa, Storehouse Worker, Mid 40s) 
As the data suggests, new immigrants have ‘weak’ ties with each other and with local 
communities. The question which follows is this: are they perhaps plugged into 
traditional communities such as clan associations, which have typically played a 
large role in Chinese immigration? 
 
Dwindling Ties in Chinese Communities 
 Historically, relationships within Chinese clans had been important features 
of an immigrant’s life. Yen (1981: 62) defines a clan as a composition of “various 
kinship-bound families”; these ties were especially resilient as they consist of kin 
groups which are “the individual's second line of defence”. Kinship ties were the 
main resource for immigrants in need due to elements of trust, obligation and 
reciprocity inherent in these relationships. Moreover, under British rule in the 
colonial era, the Chinese were living under a foreign government and amongst 








encouraged the Chinese to galvanise themselves in clan groups (ibid, p.63). The 
purposes of clan associations were to “perpetuate descent lines, to promote clan 
solidarity, and to foster traditional values which in turn uphold the idea of kinship 
(ibid, p.76).” To these ends, clans organised social and cultural activities which 
brought the community together; activities included the observance of seasonal 
festivals, the settling of disputes, the legalisation of marriages, community outreach 
and the promotion of education through various means (ibid, p78). The intent of 
clans was to preserve Chinese traditions and practices in an era when the overseas 
Chinese community was growing exponentially. These intentions of upholding 
tradition kept the Chinese immigrant community a closely-knitted and self-selective 
one.  
Today however, clan involvement amongst immigrants is uncommon. I argue 
that ethnic ties are increasingly less important to new immigrants who wish to 
establish social communities in Singapore. With the prevalence of ICTs, immigrants 
can easily link up with each other even if they did not know each other prior to their 
move to Singapore. In addition, there are many other interest groups and 
communities apart from clan associations; unlike the immigrants of the past, the ones 
today are more adaptable given that many are effectively bilingual and 
technologically-savvy. With these traits, new immigrants are well-equipped to 
explore many interest groups and are not limited to organisations which typically 
served the needs of the Chinese community. Chinese temples are examples of 
community places which were vital to old immigrants but are less relevant to new 
immigrants. Having stayed in Singapore for year, Cao Yuan (in his early 20s) stated 
that he had only visited temples “once or twice”. Similarly for Wei Tian (in his late 




“I don’t attend any religious events….  I work 12 hours daily…. When 
I first came, there was no break. They told me there will be 2 off days 
in a month and if you don’t rest then, it can be counted as over-time 
work. 
There are structural barriers contributing to clan or ethnic associations being 
out of favour today. Traditional Chinese associations which aim to preserve Chinese 
practices and values, are struggling to be relevant today. While clans are formed 
around notions of hometown and dialects, new immigrants today are diverse in 
composition and transnational in their origins, thus making it doubly hard to establish 
commonalities amongst them. For many, joining a clan is simply not possible 
because they come from new areas/communities in China which do not presently 
have clan presence in Singapore. Even if one’s hometown has a clan representation 
in Singapore, it does not necessarily guarantee involvement or even awareness of the 
clan community. Lin Yuan, who originates from Fujian, and whose clan has a strong 
presence in Singapore remains clueless about its functions. When I asked if she had 
visited the Fujian clan association, she responded with curiosity: 
“Where is the Fujian Hui Guan? Singapore is so small but I haven’t 
walked around much… What do they do there?” 
(Lin Yuan, factory Worker, Early 20s) 
This respondent subsequently mentions that she spends much of her leisure time on 
the internet or with colleagues who live with her.  
Therefore, I reason that this lack of participation stems from the growing 




some reasons surfaced. Hometown-based associations which are geographically 
defined are thus incompatible with the diversity of immigrants today.  
“Personally, I feel that there is a big difference because China is so 
big. All the Hui Guans are usually for immigrants from Guandong 
and Fujian. I am not from there... But I do have some friends who are 
on a scholarships and they are from these provinces... they do actively 
join those communities. So it really depends... if there is a clan from 
Shangxi... probably, I will be interested in that but there are none 
because there are too few people from my place.”  
(Wei Yang, Educator, Late 20s) 
The idea of membership based on hometown origins is a highly constraining one as it 
means that clans are inherently inward-looking. In contrast, in a globalising context, 
the varied nature of immigrant groups would require broad-based organisations able 
to accommodate diversity and change. As such, I contend that if clans continue to be 
rooted in a geographically bounded idea of membership, they would be 
counterproductive to new immigrants. This is because would then clans restrict and 
limit interactions to a specific group of Chinese rather than to welcome new 
immigrants.  
Interviewer: The people in the Hui Guan are people from China only 
right? 
Zhou Wen: Yes. And it’s confined to Hometowns.  
Interviewer: Yeah... and people like you would want to mix with a 




Zhou Wen: Yeah because China is so big! 
Zheng Hao: If you don’t speak the dialect, it’s very hard to mix.  
Wei Yang: None of us speak Cantonese 
All three interviewees are educators. Zhou Wen and Zheng Hao are in their mid-20s, 
while Wei Yang is his in late 20s. This narrow-approach is also seen in the choice of 
activities which the organisations run: 
Wei Yang: And for me, I think the image of Hui Guan is kinda old. It’s 
for the older generation, not really our generation. It’s for old people! 
Zheng Hao: I do have some friends who are from Shantou. They go to 
the Hui Guan every week... 
Interviewer: To do what? 
Zheng Hao: All kinds of activities.  
Zhou Wen: Really? I’m really shocked. I didn’t expect anyone from 
our age to join Hui Guans.  
Wei Yang: I went to Hui Guans several times to attend seminars and I 
saw a lot of people who were 60s or 70s.  
Interviewer: It doesn’t appeal to you? 
Wei Yang: Obviously there is a gap.  
Due to the slow pace of growth and the inherent resistance to change, clan 
associations today struggle to appeal to the younger generation. At best, it continues 




the past. In addition, clans favour the usage of dialects. Dialects however, are 
exclusive specific Chinese groups. As such, through their insistence on dialects, 
clans accentuate internal differentiations with the Chinese groups, rather than to unite 
the various sub-groups. 
 Related to clans are religious communities. I argue that the religious life of 
Chinese immigrants has shifted from one that was formerly concentrated in the 
Chinese community, to one that is widely diffused today. In the past, religious 
activities were fused with community life as ancestral worship was widely practised 
(Yen 1981: 78). However, amongst new immigrants today, there appears to be a 
segregation of religious activities and ethnic activities. None of the new immigrants I 
spoke to, made mention of ancestral worship. Ironically, there is one particular 
religious community which transcends ethnic groups and languages, and has no 
official ties to ethnic associations appears to be gaining popularity amongst new 
immigrants. This institution is the church. Several respondents suggest that the 
church is an emergent meeting ground for new immigrants. Interestingly, churches 
hardly featured in old Chinese migration history but have since become a common 
identifier for some new immigrants. 
The focus group discussion suggests that church associations often stem from 
personal beliefs and hence, there is a greater tendency for these community ties to 
persist:  
Wei Yang: Based on my observations, church compared to other 
societies is the most attractive to people like us who come from China.  




Zheng Hao: Because of the personal belief...  
Interviewer: It keeps them there? 
Zheng Hao: Sense of belonging when you join the church.  
Wei Yang: I think it’s because people from church are very kind. They 
are very helpful. When you are here and you are new, there are some 
people who can help you and make you feel at home. Then you will 
join them.  
In addition, I suggest that one reason for its success is the presence of institutional 
structures – in the form of regular weekly programme and a regular meeting place- 
which keeps these meetings sustainable. One respondent elaborates:  
“… Church groups seem the most prominent way (to integrate). I’ve a 
lot of friends in church groups… in the first two months, for sure, you 
will meet a bunch of church friends. They will come and pick you up, 
teach you how to eat Laksa and persuade you to join their church. I 
met people from church quite a few times…I attended. I went to 
church and joined them... I also went to one of the Buddhist groups… 
but I go there all for information. I don’t have the belief but I want to 
understand the beliefs.” 
(Shou Min, Mid-20s, Engineer) 
The regularity of church meetings makes it easy for immigrants to join and to stay 




based membership, much unlike the clan organisations which focus on people of the 
same dialect groups:  
“Once people join church… I do respect those people. They are so… 
open! They can accept anyone as long as you share the belief. Within 
church groups, it is much more connected… When you meet church 
people, you feel different… I still keep in touch with my church friends 
– I attended their wedding and housewarming… they still invite us for 
activities.” 
Not only are new immigrants less involved in ethnic-based associations, they are 
beginning to frequent other associations which are more diverse. However, to state 
that immigrants lack community life is inaccurate. They are being involved in newer 
communities their predecessors did not relate to.  
Overall, the data presents three themes. Most of the interviewees do not have 
family members in Singapore. When they do, it is usually because they emigrated as 
family unit. Most interviewees, even the professionals, have very small social circles 
in Singapore, even after working here for more than five years. Finally, most 
interviewees, unlike the old Chinese migrants (Topley 1961) who relied heavily on 
ethnic institutions, do not have ties with clan associations.  
Therefore, there is a de-emphasis of personal networks in immigrants’ lives 
today. First, there is a shift from the reliance on ethnic ties to that of non-ethnic ties, 
as seen in the departure from clan affiliations. Second, the pattern of a fused religious 
and ethnic community relations, is slowly changing; while in the past, ancestral 




fused with ethnicity. As the respondents suggest, non-ethnic associations are new 
platforms for immigrants to meet a wide range of people. Overall, the declining 
reliance on personal networks that occurs today stands in opposition to Massey’s 
concept of networks which are closely tied to kin and clan. However, this does not 
mean that migration networks are no longer important but that they are more closely 
tied to institutions today. In other words, migration networks which are anchored in 
personal relations have evolved in form and substance. In what follows, I discuss an 
emerging type of migration network which I term ‘institutional networks’.  
 
5.4 Institutionalised Social Bases of Migration Networks: Increasing Reliance on 
Institutional Networks 
Personal networks are increasingly ties to institutions; I thus argue migration 
today is likely to be heavily dependent on institutional networks. I define institutional 
networks as the networks which an individual possesses in relation to formal 
institutions. Specifically, I suggest that migration networks are now more rooted in 
institutions rather than in personal relations. Personal relations however, continue to 
be necessary, but are more significant when arranged in institutional settings. From 
my data, many interviewees rely on their social networks in Singapore, but these 
networks exist within frameworks of non-ethnic institutions such as alumni groups or 
formal business associations. As such, this section also highlights a particular 
intersection between personal and institutional networks, and concludes that 
institutional settings trigger the formation of personal networks which would 
otherwise not have found connections with each other. I do so by showing how 




there are interactions between personal and institutional networks; personal networks 
remain important, but it is the institutional context which triggers the formation of 
personal networks. Here, I expound on institutional networks by contrasting the 
various features to trust networks described by Tilly (2007: 5-6).  
 
Recruitment of Immigrants  
Recruitment is one area which clearly shows that immigrants are turning to 
formal organisations rather than personal friends for help. Migrants rely on networks 
with recruitment agencies to secure a job overseas. Clearly, such institutional 
networks are bounded by business contracts, rather than moral obligations. As such, 
these institutional networks are markedly differently from ‘trust networks’. Cao 
Yuan describes how he found a job in Singapore:  
 “Yes I had an agent and I had to pay fees of S$10,000 to get here. It’s 
a lot of money so I had to borrow from friends and family. So far, I’ve 
paid back S$5000 but there’s still S$5000 left. Agencies are 
everywhere in China; all over the country! They advertise for study 
abroad programmes, or work abroad programmes or other 
programmes. A lot of them…” 
(Cao Yuan, Early 20s, Chambermaid) 
At these conventions, a potential immigrant has a range of destinations to pick from. 





“Many countries. Everything you want is there… so US, UK, 
Canada… Many. Actually, all the good countries are there… You 
know, the more modern and developed places. Of course African 
countries aren’t there… only the ‘good’ countries.” 
Recruitment agencies are selling ‘good’ destinations to migrant workers. These 
agencies are proliferating in China and are commercialising the migration process. 
Interestingly, the demand for these overseas placements is huge, so much so that 
many non-professional workers resort to borrowing money in order to pay the agents.  
Sun Yang who works in the Food and Beverage (F&B) industry, shares about his job 
search:  
“(I contacted) a middleman from China, who is also working here. He 
got in touch with the middleman here and found the job for me… I 
had to pay the middleman fees – 40,000 RMB… I paid before I got 
here (borrowed from family members)… I guess if you want to go 
abroad, you need to pay some fees.” 
He contacted two middlemen with whom he never kept in touch with after the job 
placement was completed.  
While I suggest that agents and their companies are part of larger institutions 
which serve to connect immigrant labour to job opportunities, I am nevertheless 
aware that many processes are not always regulated or formalised, thus leading to 
instances of exploitation. Comparatively, unlike trust networks which ensure that 




networks often involve one-off interactions and impersonal processes.  For example, 
one respondent’s employers refused to pay him his salary:  
“I borrowed money from a bank (in China), and I haven’t returned it. 
They are asking me for the money now…  I borrowed 60,000RMB.” 
(Zhou Wa, Storehouse Worker, Mid-40s) 
It has been three years since he borrowed this sum of money and the interest 
continues to accumulate:  
“Adding the interest. [Takes out phone to show me a SMS that the 
bank sent to him] You look at this… They’re telling me that I’m 
supposed to have paid up already and I need to call them. They want 
me to pay up now; bit by bit. And you look at the date… this was 
March 2011 and they are still asking me for the money.” 
Furthermore, he is unable to clear his debt on a monthly basis as his previous 
company refused to pay him his wages: 
“When I came, it was 60,000RMB. [Refers to the message] Look 
here… it was due March 2011. It’s June now so it has been three 
months. I borrowed it in 2008. I am still trying to pay it now, but with 
much less monthly payments. Remember the previous company owes 
me 4 months of salary… if I had gotten that, I would have cleared a 
portion of this debt.”  
These narratives of immigrants borrowing money large sums from banks for an 




circumstances are unfortunately not uncommon. In addition, information is not 
always widely available nor the application processes transparent. As Zhou Wa 
elaborates:  
“When I first came, I was looking for job… but my experience was 
mainly in maintenance and they told me that it would be hard to find a 
similar job in Singapore. But after I handed over the money, I was not 
allowed to take it back… that 5,000RMB initially. Anyway, when they 
find the job in Singapore, they ask for the rest of the payment and 
won’t really say what kind of job that is. They would say, you go and 
work and see how it goes.” 
Apart from ambiguous terms, respondents are often unable to articulate how the 
agent fees are being used. Wei Tian, who currently works in the F&B industry is 
clearly unaware of the entire processes:  
 Interviewer: But, after paying the 5000RMB, there is no guarantee 
that the middleman can find a job for you right? 
Wei Tian: No guarantee.  
Interviewer: Other than the 5000RMB, what else do you pay for? 
Wei Tian: Ok if they find a job for me in Singapore, I have to pay 
45,000RMB, thereabout. 




Wei Tian: This goes to the middleman, and I think the middleman has 
to give some to the other middleman in Singapore. I don’t really know 
the situation.  
Interviewer: Basically, you paid that sum of money to the middleman 
in China right? 
Wei Tian: Yes. As for how much he gives to the middleman in 
Singapore, I really don’t know. Also, this sum of money does not 
include the airfare; we have to purchase that on our own. So the 
money is just for the middlemen on both sides… I think I paid about 
50,000RMB. Fees and airfare is already 48,000RMB. Then I had to 
buy things before I came here.” 
In fact, all my respondents paid different amounts even if they originate from the 
same regions. Placement fees are therefore arbitrary and this inconsistency amongst 
application processes reveals the informal aspect of this business. In this case, the 
recruitment process is institutionalised yet informal.  
 To exacerbate matters, the lack of transparency allows institutional actors to 
control workers. Lin Yuan, a factory worker in her late 20s describes her experience 
with agencies:  
“When we come here… we know what to expect because we were 
already told of the working expectations before we came. For some 
people… they find that the salary is too low. And another thing is the 




don’t know if this is the law in Singapore. They only return it when we 
return and we need to pay $5000 before we get it back.” 
Yet, despite the inconsistencies amongst agents, I still consider these networks to be 
institutional and formal networks because they are arranged along formal 
organisational lines in the form of recruitment and companies. Moreover, they are 
driven by corporate economic agendas. Taken together, these traits are vastly 
different from trust or personal networks which hinge on reciprocity and obligation.  
The professionals however, experience different kind of institutionalised 
recruitment process. It is a process that is more regulated and transparent. Given their 
wider social circles, they also tap on a wider pool of networks. This differs from trust 
networks which are socially and economically concentrated. Li Mei, an educator, 
describes how she found a job through an online government portal:  
“Well, I knew that the Ministry of Education (MOE) would look for 
Chinese teachers every year so I went to the website to look. Then I 
downloaded the form and emailed it back to MOE…. Everything was 
done via the internet… My husband had gotten the job and I was 
getting ready to come over already. So that worked out. It was about 
2-3 weeks after I came that MOE contacted me…. 
Relatedly, her husband’s relocation was planned by a headhunting company:  
“Oh, for my husband… it’s because the office in Singapore went to 
Shanghai to look for workers...  and he had a phone interview. After 
that, he came over… The Singapore company is linked to headhunting 




Shanghai. The Singapore company will call to interview and decide if 
they want to hire the person.” 
Here, the transaction occurs between the husband’s company and the headhunting 
firm; unlike in the case of the non-professionals, the company rather than the 
individual, pays for the job placement.  
Evidently, there is a differential treatment of professionals vis-à-vis non-
professionals (Figure 19). The professionals are serviced by systems which are well-
regulated and have their companies pay the recruitment fees on their behalf, while 
the non-professionals have to bear the hefty recruitment fees on their own. For both 
groups, it is evident that the process of recruitment is fast becoming commercialised 
and institutionalised.  
 
 




The recruitment processes of Chinese immigrants are increasingly institutionalised. 
This stands in contrast to the recruitment of old immigrants described in chapter 
three. Specifically, during the colonial period, recruitment patterns were concentrated 
and recruitment channels were based on ethnic ties; Chinese workers were recruited 
via Chinese clans or Chinese village communities and middlemen were always a 
Chinese with links to specific Chinese communities. However, these concentrated 
patterns have overtime, become diffused due to commercialisation.  
  
Migrant Organisations 
 Adaptation is another aspect of immigrant lives which shows an increasing 
reliance on formal institutions. When difficulties arise, several respondents turn to 
migrant Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) for help. One sought legal help 
from a migrant NGO:  
 “So… I got injured at work but I have no insurance. I did need to see 
the doctor so I went. However, I had no money to pay for the 
operation so I went back to the company to ask for help. The company 
was not willing to pay so I came to the migrant organisation to ask for 
help. The organisation helped me file a report to the authorities and 
the case is currently being investigated. Right now, the company is 
making things difficult for me. The migrant organisation got a lawyer 
for me and I am just waiting to hear from the lawyer.” 




Migrant NGOs also help to appeal for their unpaid salaries, and request for higher 
wages. Wei Tian, who has been unpaid for months, sought help in official 
applications to authorities: 
“I do have two requests. One is for the migrant organisation to help 
me get the back the unpaid salary, and the other is… it seems 
Singapore recognises paper qualifications. I had a secondary school 
certificate from back home… if I have to renew my work permit 
(which is due soon), I’m wondering whether this could help me ask for 
a higher salary.” 
Much like Wei Tian, many Chinese non-professional Chinese migrants are unable to 
write formal letters and applications due to their lack of proficiency in the English 
language. Without a strong friendship support base, they eventually turn to NGOs for 
help. This finding goes against Massey’s model of migrant networks which suggest 
that migrants’ peers and kin are the first line of support in a foreign country. 
Institutional networks are thus on the rise.  Relatedly, these institutional networks 
persist due to the lack of networks amongst Chinese immigrants in Singapore, and 
this is markedly different from trust networks which are self-sustaining as 
immigrants tend to congregate in certain areas. This example reveals that a growing 
pool of immigrants is turning to formal organisations for assistance.  
 
Alumni Institutions 
 Formal institutions are also rapidly the dominant source of social support for 




characterised by broad-based memberships, are compatible with the diversity of new 
immigrants today. In these institutions with broad-based notions of membership, 
members are free to construct networks with a wide range of people, unlike trust 
networks which confines members to a relatively narrow range of opportunities.  
The professionals also rely on formal institutions; but they usually do so for 
social support rather than for social assistance. According to Shou Min who works as 
an engineer here in Singapore, he got to know many friends from his hometown 
(Shandong) while in Singapore. This question then remains: If new immigrants from 
the same hometown only become acquainted in Singapore, how do they meet? I 
propose that personal networks are particularly robust in the context of in the 
institutions such as alumni association group. He describes how personal networks 
are established in the context of alumni associations:  
Interviewer: But how do you all find each other? Say, you’re from 
Shandong uni and you come to Singapore. How do you find other 
people from Shandong university? 
Shou Min: Oh. You must… let it grow. I mean, you know your 
friends… 
Interviewer: So it’s personal networks? 
Shou Min: Yes, personal networks. Gradually it gets bigger. When a 
big event happens like in November 2011… it was 110th anniversary 
of my university… the vice-president of the university came over. We 
as a social group, we represent my university alumni… we organised 




China, Confucius Institute (at the National Technological University), 
some industrial leaders… 
Alumni institutions are therefore important avenues for new immigrants to interact. 
Unlike the clan associations which are centred on ethnic networks and districts of 
origin, alumni institutions are broad enough to accommodate a range of new 
immigrants, but still allow them to share the commonalities associated with being 
from the same educational institution. Shou Min explains that these institutions are 
social institutions: 
“I’m representing the China Alumni Associations, working with your 
local clan associations... I meet them every 3 months. The clan 
associations have a plan for the whole year, we have activities also, 
and also another group is.... Business China. There is also another 
group called Chinese Commerce something... so I am representing the 
China uni alumni (consisting of 3000 members) and we all meet every 
3 months and support each other in the activities.” 
These activities range from social to business-related one:  
“For Business China and China Commerce, most likely are business-
related. For clan associations, it is culture-related. For us, it is new 
immigrants, also culture-related. We organise gatherings and 
parties.” 
Shou Min further discusses the activities which go on in alumni associations:  
“In Singapore, there are many China university graduates right... like 




transferred to Singapore) but I consider myself a university alumni… 
Uni Alumni groups gather for food and wine very often. Beijing 
university, Tsing Hua, Shanghai Jiao da all have groups too. These 
top ones are registered already – they have an organisation and a 
team.”  
Alumni institutions are therefore emerging social bases for new Chinese immigrants 
in Singapore.  
 
 
Figure 20: Conceptualisation of ‘institutional networks’ 
 
5.5 Summary 
In this chapter, I conclude that institutional networks – which constitute many 
‘weak ties’- underpin the social organisation of Chinese migration today (Figure 20). 




usually within the ethnic community. According to Granovetter’s (1973) 
classifications of social networks, personal relations are strong and deep ties but do 
not have far-reaching effects; simply put, they do not have the ‘strength of weak 
ties’. In contrast, I reason that an individual’s networks to various institutions –also 
known as institutional ties- are wide-ranging and usually functional. Given their 
wide-ranging capabilities, they possess the ‘strength of weak ties’. This means that 
immigrants could be marginally or periodically linked to an institution, and yet 
benefit greatly from vast amounts of information that circulates within and between 
these networks. Specifically, actors tend to get non-redundant or new information 
from social ties to which they are weakly connected to. Such weak ties become 
important in modern society in which network density, or the extent to which people 
know each other, is lower than traditional society.  Since the network density is 
lower today, the bases of networks are inevitably more dispersed. Therefore, 
immigrants are likely to rely on institutional networks today. With this proliferation 
of institutional networks, the next chapter discusses functionally differentiated 






THE RISE OF THE CHINA-SINGAPORE MIGRATION INDUSTRY 
With the proliferation of institutional networks, institutions become 
increasingly important to the processes of migration. The diversity of immigrant 
groups, coupled with the fact that new immigrants have few, if any, pre-existing 
social contacts in Singapore poses the question of how they find their way to 
Singapore. As argued, personal networks do not adequately explain how a wide array 
of new immigrant groups end up in Singapore for the first time. So if immigrants are 
relying less on personal relations alone, what kind of social organisation undergirds 
Chinese immigration today? In this chapter, I suggest that the conditions of 
globalisation have facilitated the exponential growth of immigration today, thus 
spurring growth in the migration industry. I present a two-fold conceptualisation of 
the migration industry. First, I define it as a functional differentiation of services. I 
list four functions of immigration services provided by private businesses, the state 
and non-profit institutions. Second, I explain that the migration industry emerges 
within the context of longstanding political and economic relations between China 
and Singapore. I use the case of the China-Singapore migration industry and argue 
that China and Singapore have unique economic and historical ties which allow for 
this industry to flourish.  
 
6.1 Migration Industry: an emergent theme in Migration Studies 
 In recent years, there has been growing attention given to the concept of 




opportunities for cross-border movements with increased mobility generating new 
demands for services such as shipping and air cargo companies, import-export firms, 
labour contractors, and money transfer houses (Glick-Schiller 1995: 55). These 
services in turn encourage more migration flows. For example, Giese (2003: 166) 
notes that the influx of Chinese immigrants into Germany is in part due to 
commercial agencies in China which deal with passport, visa and placement services. 
The concept is gaining importance because of growing recognition that migration 
research is presently inclined toward emphasizing agency and neglecting institutional 
perspectives. In addition, the large scale and rapid speed of global migration has 
resulted in the expansion of businesses both legal and illegal, and supports such 
cross-border movements. As Krissman suggests:  
 “scholars have failed to systematically tie employers and their 
recruitment agents to their analyses of international migration even 
though these actors are well documented.”(Krissman 2005: 8) 
The ‘migration industry’ concept is useful as it focuses on the institutional actors 
involved in migration.  
 
6.2 Critique of the Migration Industry 
This concept is commonly used loosely and for descriptive purposes. Here, I 
unpack its various meanings by presenting several critiques of the concept. First, the 
concept is primarily applied to illegal migration and is therefore, somewhat 
imbalanced.  Salt and Stein (1997) popularised this concept in 1997 and suggested 
that it referred to both illegal and legal migration. Yet, research on migration industry 




unlawful organisation of human trafficking (Salt and Stein 1997). Therefore, I 
propose that a greater emphasis be placed on legal migration because the scale and 
scope of such migration today opens up many new areas to be examined. Second, I 
problematize the term ‘industry’. While this concept invokes notions of profitability 
and productivity, the state which is technically non-profit in nature, is actually 
extremely powerful in driving this development. For the purposes of my discussion, I 
question Hernandez-Leon’s (2005: 1) description of the migration industry defined 
as  
“the ensemble of entrepreneurs, businesses and services which, 
motivated by the pursuit of financial gain, facilitate and sustain 
international migration.” 
Specifically, I point out that some actors do not directly pursue financial gains but 
yet, are critical to sustaining international migration.  
Most works identify various actors involved in migration processes, and 
usually refer to agents or middlemen or businessmen. However, with legal migration, 
the spectrum of actors extends beyond these existing categories. In their influential 
article, Salt and Stein (1997) demonstrate with European data that human trafficking 
is a huge “business”. Their notion of “migration business” is defined as (1997: 467): 
“… A system of institutionalised networks with complex profit and 
loss accounts, including a set of institutions, agents and individuals 
each of which stands to make a commercial gain.” 
There is reference to the emergence of actors and institutions that capitalise, often 




in the area of legal migration in the form of new actors and businesses. Therefore, I 
argue that actors could include people in private enterprises and also those in the 
non-profit and public sectors, and include both personal and institutional actors. 
These distinctions lead me to explore the increased role of the state in the face of 
prevalent migration. Third, migration industry is a somewhat paradoxical term. 
Migration processes work on the one hand with institutionalised and formalised 
procedures, but on the other hand, they continue to rely on personal and informal 
relations. Although the concept focuses on large-scale processes, it should not 
neglect the small-scale mechanisms which are still in operation today. Using 
smuggling cases from Ecuador and China, Kyle and Liang (2001) develop a 
synonymous concept called “migration merchants”, which refers to actors who profit 
from smuggling. Interestingly, although the migration industry perspective delves 
into issues of formality, complexity and organisation, the finding is that informal and 
small-scale operations continue to persist. Spencer’s work (2004) supports this thesis 
by showing that Mexican migrant smuggling to the US is still essentially a ‘cross-
border cottage industry’. By this, he means that it relies on small-scale smugglers 
located within the Mexican immigrant community itself. While complex institutional 
systems and processes are emerging, traditional methods such as personal ties and 
small-scale operations persist. Fourth, while the concept emerged in the social 
science literature only in 1997 (Salt and Stein 1997), the services facilitating 
migration have existed before that. It is thus necessary to understand the older forms 
of immigration businesses alongside emerging ones. Research from the business 
school literature, especially Human Resource Management (HRM), is rife with work 
on expatriates, mobility and relocation (Dolins 2007; Forster 1992; Haines and Saba 




professionals are also not new, but research on the evolution of this industry remains 
sparse. ‘Immigration consulting firms’ (Tseng 1997) for instance, is a new service 
innovation, providing specialised advice on immigration services and the marketing 
of immigration opportunities. Today, new services emerge alongside these existing 
ones.  
6.3 Functional Differentiation of Migration Services  
I address the aforementioned criticisms of the concept by analysing various 
processes which facilitate migration. This section discusses the ways in which 
immigration as a process is functionally differentiated (Figure 21). As a result of this 
division of labour, there is a proliferation of organisations dealing with immigration 
procedures. These organisations include profit-driven enterprises, the state as well as 
non-profit support services.  
Critique of migration industry concept Propositions Empirical case 
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Figure 21: Conceptual critique and propositions 
In contrast to Massey’s model of migration which suggests that migration is self-
sustaining through personal ties, this section demonstrates how the processes have 
become more complex and thus require specialised migration services to sustain it. 
 
6.3 China-Singapore Connection: Political and Economic Relations 
Migration industries are tailored to the conditions of various migration 
systems. The widespread and global scale of migration today affirms the presence of 
actors who mediate this process. These actors include recruitment professionals, 
lawyers, travel agents to name a few, and are termed ‘important gatekeepers’ (Hugo 
1996). The migration industry phenomenon extends to many countries, and each has 
its internal variations. In East Asia, the migration industry is highly institutionalised 
with the state playing a large role and has formalised processes governing it (Surak 
2011; Tseng 1997). In contrast, the case of Thailand shows the predominance of 
informal relations for the perpetuation of this industry. In particular, three types of 
networks undergird this industry: employee-employer and patron-client relations, 
agents and recruiters and the operation of syndicates (Singhanetra-Renard 1992: 
193). Likewise, this industry is characterised by the initiatives of smugglers and 
backroom dealings (Kyle and Goldstein 2011) in Ecuador. In Mexican immigration 
to the US, ethnic entrepreneurs drive the industry with their personal relations 
(Hernández-León 2008).  
I thus argue that there are certain characteristics of the China-Singapore 




To understand my case study, I first examine the China-Singapore connection. 
Singapore and China have economic partnerships on many levels. Since China 
opened up its economy in 1978, it has been establishing ties with Southeast Asia and 
in particular, Singapore and Malaysia, with hopes of greater economic integration. 
The establishment of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 2010 was a 
critical development for these two regions. This FTA establishes an economic region 
with over a billion consumers and vibrant trade relations (Wong and Chan 2003). 
However, there is room for growth as the agreements regarding goods and services 
are more mature than those pertaining to financial markets (Laurenceson 2003). On 
the bilateral front, the China-Singapore FTA was signed in 2009. This agreement 
boosted the trade of goods and services thus enabling Singaporean manufacturers 
some advantages over their competitors, especially those in the region (Wong 2008). 
In 2011, China was one of Singapore’s top trading partners, with trading activities 
valued at over  S$101 billion, second only to Malaysia (Department of Statistics 
2012: 149).  
 
Economic Collaborations 
As a developmental state, Singapore is actively pursuing economic interests 
abroad. From the 1980s onwards, Singapore was on a regionalisation campaign, 
which sought to strengthen economic ties with neighbouring countries. This was 
during a time when Singapore was undergoing an industrial restructuring. It was 
beginning to focus on value-added manufacturing processes and export-led 




collaborated with their Chinese counterparts in several joint developments. The 
Suzhou Industrial Park (SIP) in the 1990s is one such example.  
I argue that these projects are highly institutionalised, and to some extent, 
they represent a special relationship between Singapore and China. The SIP project 
was driven by institutions - Chinese and Singaporean governments, their agencies, 
and various private corporations (Inkpen and Wang 2006).  These projects which are 
governed and implemented by states, MNCs and related organisations are often 
aimed at boosting the FDIs of the parties involved (Phelps and Wu 2009).  The heavy 
involvement of political and business organisations sheds lights on the political 
economy shaping China-Singapore businesses. Yeung (2000: 836) adopts the 
perspective of the “political economy of international investments in China”, and 
reasons that the success between China and Singapore are in part because 
Singaporean firms are plugged into a dense network of socio-political relationships. 
The political clout emanating from these networks facilitate the establishment of 
Singaporean businesses and projects in China. In sum, apart from economic abilities, 
Singapore must have had a good grasp of Chinese local governments and Chinese 
politics in order to establish economic projects in a post-socialist state, which was 
only beginning to adapt to capitalist practices. 
It is within these political and economic contexts that relations between China 
and Singapore continued to grow. Economic collaborations and knowledge transfers 
continued into the 21
st
 century with projects such as the Wuxi-Singapore Industrial 
Park, the Eco-City in Tianjin, Sino-Singapore Nanjing Eco Hi-tech Island and the 
Singapore-Sichuan Hi-tech Innovation Park to name a few. In addition, there are also 




historical links through migration and a shared language. These cultural similarities 
cement strong political-economic relationships.  
Finally, as a result of these China-Singapore connections, specific 
institutional arrangements have been introduced to govern China-Singapore 
migration. According to Lin (2010), some common institutional arrangements and 
actors include the Operating Companies of Labour Service Cooperation
6
, the 
Intermediary Agencies for Overseas Employment
7
. There are less authorised 
channels such as employment agents and middlemen who seldom have Operational 
Qualification Certificate. These institutional arrangements encourage a sustained 
China-Singapore migration.  
 
6.4 Singapore-China Migration Industry 
6.4.1 Immigrant Recruitment   
Since Chinese immigrants today are remarkably diverse, the processes behind 
recruitment become relevant. What kinds of social networks or social capital do they 
tap on if not for the traditional source of kinship relations?  I examine the case of 
                                                 
6
 Foreign labour service cooperation refers to the economic activities that domestic enterprises 
conclude contracts with foreign or overseas companies, intermediary institutions or private employers 
which are permitted to recruit or employ foreign workers, and recruit, select and dispatch Chinese 
citizens abroad (or out of the mainland) in an organized way to provide foreign employers with labour 
services pursuant to the contractual stipulations, carry out the management accordingly in accordance 
with the Provisions on the Measures for the Administration of Operation Qualification of Foreign 
Labor Service Cooperation. The enterprises that get the Operation Qualification of Foreign Labor 
Service Cooperation and Credentials of Labor Service Cooperation from the Ministry of Commerce 
are called the “Operating Companies of Labor Service Cooperation (Lin 2010: 198).” 
7
 “Overseas employment” refers to the employment activities in which Chinese citizens sign labour 
contracts with overseas employers, provide work abroad and get remunerations for their work (Lin 




legal migration and argue that the lack of social capital on the part of Chinese 
immigrants, translates into a heavy reliance on recruitment agencies. Specifically, 
there are information gaps between Chinese immigrant communities within China, 
and communities between China and Singapore. Yet, knowledge about migration 
opportunities circulates because government bodies and businesses respond by 
creating services which fill this need. This production of knowledge networks on a 
large scale has resulted in the emergence of various migration-relevant institutions. 
Two institutional trends are particularly evident amongst the recruitment of new 
immigrants: commercialisation of the recruitment processes and the state’s 
involvement in recruitment.  
 
Commercialisation of Immigration 
The commercialisation of recruitment is apparent across the spectrum of 
migrants. The most obvious manifestation of this is seen by the presence of the large-
scale organisation of fairs and conventions, whose purpose is to market overseas job 
opportunities. Migrating for work is a highly marketable activity and as China 
continues to liberalise, more people are encouraged go abroad. Accordingly, agencies 
are initiating more career and emigration conventions. As a respondent suggests, 
there is also an expansion of sources from which agencies select 
immigrants/workers:  
“Yes there are a lot of middlemen…  I tell you, it’s mainly the 
Northeast – Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning and Shandong. A lot of 





(Zhou Wa,Storehouse Worker, Mid-40s) 
In addition, potential immigrants have a wide selection of countries to go to due to 
the proliferation of destination countries as many advanced economies are in need of 
migrant labour. This is particular true for non-professionals as they become the “new 
industrial reserve army” in these societies which have a constant need for short-term 
migrant labour (Athukorala 2006; Castles and Kosack 2010: 24).  
“The fees required to come to Singapore are lower. To go to Canada 
or Japan, you will get more money but you pay more fees to go there. 
Also, if you go there, you need to learn the language first, like English 
or Japanese, so you need some employment training. To come to 
Singapore, you don’t need to… you just need to give them the initial 
5,000RMB then they will find a job for you.”  
(Wei Tian, Coffeeshop Assistant, Late-30s) 
Interestingly, destinations are ranked in a certain hierarchy. The placement fees vary 
depending on which destination one picks, thus indicating a pricing structure in this 
industry. Typically, migrating to Western countries cost more than moving to Asian 
destinations. Within Asia, Japan is usually the costliest and offers most short-term 
placement, perhaps due to its restrictive immigration policies. Wei Tian continues to 
share that his friends had moved to other destinations: 
“Some (of my friends) went to South Korea to be fishermen. At my 
village, there are a lot of people who come out to work.  Some others 
went to Poland… others went to Japan. Oh I went to Japan before for 




In Japan, he was involved in agricultural work such as “growing vegetables”. 
Interestingly, he relied on the same method as he did coming to Singapore – 
middlemen.  
 “I found a job in Singapore through a middleman from back home… 
I spent… 100,000 RMB for half a year… Their contract was only for 6 
months. We go in April and that was spring in Japan, and we work till 
October. When it is nearing winter, we go back… I liked it! It’s quite 
like Singapore. 
It also appears that this recruitment channel is a popular one amongst Chinese 
migrants from this hometown. Wei Tian followed a batch of fellow immigrants into 
Japan:  
“That time, a lot of us went there – about 118 of us! All of them came 
back but 2 ran away! So these 2 stayed on for over a year but 
eventually came home… we all grew vegetables… For half a year, I 
made 260,000RMB, much more than what I get in Singapore…” 
 
Recruitment in batches is evidently practised amongst middlemen. As I will show 
later, MNCs also have this practice of recruiting in batches but they do so through a 
professional recruitment agency. Unlike the recruitment processes amongst old 
migrants which depended on specific social ties, migrant recruitment today is a 
generalised and non-customised process. Interestingly, these immigrants describe the 
immigration experience as a form of consumption; they select a destination based on 




seldom had choices and had to work wherever they were assigned, the immigrant’s 
work stint today reflects more choices.  
 
Headhunting Industry 
 Headhunting is an industry that mediates the relationship between a 
corporation and its potential hires. ‘Client’ refers to the corporation and ‘candidate’ 
refers to the potential hire. The work of this industry differs from that of the 
middlemen namely because they have different client segments. Headhunters 
typically place candidates in mid-level and lower-level managerial jobs, as well as 
professional, technical, and office-support jobs (Cole 1985; Finlay and Coverdill 
1999). Recently however, one headhunter informed me that even established 
international firms are starting to take interest in the market servicing short-term 
migrant labour. This business of headhunting thus services a very stratified pool of 
customers and it tailors its services to the needs of clients. Headhunters search for 
potential candidates through various institutionalised means such as career fairs and 
job portals. Fazial shares his general strategy:  
“The bigger companies hold fairs and exhibitions but for my medium-
sized company, but my company networks through the CV reviews and 
the phone calls and the network of referrals. The best candidates are 
always from referrals... it is always these candidates whom the 
company’s HR picks. It’s not really ones I get from my email inbox. 
When you refer, you build a certain level of trust and they refer you to 
someone they trust as well… I just have to put the ads the clients come 




picture of how I recruit. I’ll send my adverts; first, it is published in 
jobstreet.sg. We bought 2000 advert spaces – as long as we post, we 
get responses.” 
(Fazial, Headhunter) 
These general strategies are complemented by personalised ones. I will develop this 
argument later by showing how headhunters rely on personal connections to recruit.  
Although headhunters contribute to the institutionalisation of immigration, 
they still use personal connections. Extensive personal relations remain critical. As 
one headhunter informed me, the recruitment business is all about networks. 
Headhunters are required to frequently network with corporations so as to understand 
emerging manpower needs.  
“We have another kind of strategy. Say, I am the recruiter and you 
are my client company. If I give you a cold call, I say ok I am a 
recruiter, can I just understand that I have this candidate who has 
expressed interest in your company. Would you like to take a look at 
his/her credentials? I’m just marketing what I have here... but since 
you are open, you might say, ok please set up an interview for me. We 
don’t have vacant positions at the moment. In the case whereby they 
hire, you pay me only when the candidate comes on board.” 
(Natalie, Headhunter) 
This headhunter has to establish wide connections with corporations, so as to be 




The depth of his social networks becomes very crucial when the headhunter 
has to find specific candidates. Fazial thus leverages on all forms of social media and 
calls in order to connect with potential candidates.   
“We have another kind: you (as the company) have a need, very 
specialized and very hard to find. You might call... and they would 
say, ok I’ve done business with you before, and I need you on this new 
task. I need you to do headhunting for me. Then I will say, since you 
need me to do this search for you, I will need commitment and 
exclusivity... I would ask for 5% of the estimated fee to start off. So I 
will search them through the competing companies. So let’s say this is 
pharmaceutical company A.... I will call B, C, D to ask if these people 
are willing to move to A. Through referrals as well... it’s like a witch-
hunt – Linkedin, Facebook, any kinds of possible social media and 
you start asking for referrals. Then we will process and screen them 
and send the CV out to clients. 
Fazial is adopting a strategic use of social media, or what is termed “social 
recruiting” (Soni 2011). This kind of networking with the candidate extends beyond 
the recruitment phase. As the respondent explained, it is essential to maintain ties 
with his candidates after a successful deal. This allows him to build his base of 
professional networks. Continual networking is a strategy amongst headhunters. 
“After placing... to me, a candidate is not a transaction. I am still in 
touch with my candidates. I have a file... after placing, I put there 
‘case closed – secured’. And I’ll get another one and so on. These are 




email, SMS and so on. Basically, if I place someone, the job is only 
one-third done.”  
(Fazial, Headhunter) 
The placement is just one-third the job done. The bulk of the task is to maintain ties 
with the candidate to ensure that he/she transits smoothly into the job, and to build a 
base of social contacts for further use. Fazial describes his strategy for personal 
networking:  
“My dad is a cab driver. I give him my name cards, I am using him as 
a marketing tool – if you have a good conversation with a 
professional, give them my card. So one of them has called me up and 
said ‘I’m from Germany or US and I’m looking actively for a job’ and 
the job becomes easier for me. These personal networks allow me to 
find very special candidates who are directors and managers in their 
companies and instead of asking them, can I pitch my candidates to 
you, they would be telling me can I give you my CV?  They would fly 
to Singapore for meetings and then they would call me up and meet in 
the hotel lobby. I’ve actually made one good friend this way. He’s 
somebody up there, from Bangladesh. He’s doing financial planning 
and analysis for a big pharmaceutical company. He wants to stay in 
this region and based in Indonesia but looking for a job elsewhere. 
So…. It’s networking everywhere!” 
Despite the presence of headhunting companies which appear to institutionalise the 








 This section shifts the perspective to that of the companies. Recruitment is 
being institutionalised as corporations are outsourcing this task to recruitment 
companies. Corporations are engaging specialised recruitment companies to recruit 
employees and this transforms recruitment into a rationalised and detached process. 
For professionals, the corporations they work for typically outsource recruitment to 
headhunting companies.  
“My husband came to Singapore because the office here went to 
Shanghai to look for workers...  and he had a phone interview. After 
that, he came over. The Singapore company is linked to the 
headhunting company over in Shanghai…  this is how they find people 
from Shanghai. The Singapore company will call to interview and 
decide if they want to hire the person.” 
(Li Me, Educator, Late 30s) 
The process is usually impersonal, as with processes involving institutional 
networks. They usually involve ‘weak’ and temporary social ties driven by function 
rather than personal relations.  
Similarly, for the non-professionals, the company interested in hiring workers 
approaches a recruitment agency. The difference between recruitment of 




on a large scale and in batches, rather than the personalised approach adopted for the 
professionals. Steven, a human resource manager in a manufacturing multinational 
company (MNC) described how his company started hiring migrants from China:  
“We started recruiting Chinese workers as we couldn’t get workforce 
from locals to fill up the positions in logistics and warehousing work. 
The reason being… in terms of work nature, hardship… we had 
problems finding people. We went through an agent; we told them 
what the company is doing and our job nature and from there, they 
helped us look for workers with relevant experience. Relevant as in… 
don’t mind working in a factory and warehouse environment. From 
there, they will send us the resume, we will look through and the guys 
will select. The agent will then arrange the workers and bring them to 
Singapore. So once they are in, on the first day, we will do a company 
induction in Mandarin – what we’re doing, safety issues. The agent, 
prior to that, will take them around and show them how to take public 
transport from their rented flat…” 
Thereafter, batches of new recruits are put through an orientation programme with 
the company:  
“So once they come in and settle down, the agents will on and off 
come and visit them to ask if they are ok. After a while… they will get 
used to living here very fast, because they have friends here, so they 





(Steven, HR manager) 
The major stages of the relocation process – recruitment and orientation – are 
outsourced. This MNC makes known the types of workers needed to the recruitment 
agency, and the latter will deal with everything from recruitment to orientation. The 
MNC becomes involved only in the final decision-making stage: 
“Basically we leave it to the Singapore agent. The Singapore agent 
will outsource to the Chinese agent, who knows the people there. They 
select and the Singapore side goes to China to interview. Then they 
will find the most suitable ones and pass to us. We will then review 
and decide.” 
(Steven, HR manager)  
This institutionalised process between MNCs and recruitment companies is rather 
transparent. Workers know where there are being allocated and companies are aware 
of the capabilities of the recruits. According to the HR manager:  
“Some of them here are diploma holders. When we recruit them, they 
know they’re working in logistics environment. They know what they 
are here for. In a way, they know they are not being over-promised. 
This is why we say some of them actually have the potential to do 
more but are reluctant to do so.” 
In contrast to the middlemen (addressed in the following section), these certified 
recruitment agencies enlisted by MNCs are more consistent with their processes and 
transparent with their objectives. Certified companies have clearer and more 




institutionalised and established these agencies are, the clearer their functions and 
processes.  
Incidentally, the outsourcing of cross-border recruitment has facilitated the 
development of other businesses. For example, there is always the need for 
information that can be accessed:  
“You’ll be surprised as to what you can find online. [Takes out a 
sheet of paper from file] This is a communication network that is done 
by the Chinese. From here, there is list of different countries that 
Chinese people are working in. There’s also a column on studying 
overseas… what I printed out is only on Singapore. So they tell you 
what are the jobs... what are the recruitment process, where to stay, 
what are the employment laws and benefits.” 
(Steven, HR Manager) 
This manager refers me to a website entitled “Chuguo.cn” (translated to mean 
emigration) which contains relevant information such as job opportunities and 
current affairs in Singapore. Related companies advertise and market their immigrant 
services on such websites.  
This production and proliferation of immigration-related or immigrant-related 
information is what Tyner (1999: 199) terms the “cyber-commodification” of 
immigrant labour. Many of such websites which are managed by consulting 
companies within China have emerged in recent years, and contribute to immigration 
services. Immigrant recruitment today is therefore heavily supported by professional 




Inconsistencies in the Middlemen Business  
Although the demand for the services of middlemen is on the rise, the 
processes surrounding them are not fully institutionalised; there are several 
inconsistencies across the board, usually with regards to application procedures and 
agent fees. These inconsistencies are the result of the migrant’s lack of knowledge of 
local systems, which exposes the migrant to potential “exploitation” by unauthorised 
middlemen (Spaan 1994: 93). One respondent possesses scant knowledge of the 
middleman: 
Interviewer: So there’s a middleman in Shandong and another 
middleman in Singapore? 
Zhou Wa: Hmm, that I don’t know, they didn’t say.  
Interviewer: Did they give you a contract? 
Zhou Wa: No, they didn’t. It’s like this: if we want to go abroad, we 
go and make an inquiry and ask where we can go. Then we pay 
5000RMB as a deposit. It’s just a deposit – if I decide not to go, I 
can’t take this 5000RMB back. If they successfully find me a job in 
Singapore, this 5000RMB can be transferred to the payment for the 
middleman fees.  
 (Zhou Wa, Storehouse Worker) 
Three critical aspects are missing: the middleman contact details, the job contract and 
confirmation of a job. Despite paying fees, this worker is left uncertain if he would 




they encounter problems in Singapore. Sun Yang, who works in the F&B industry, 
recounts a negative experience:  
Interviewer: I’m very curious about the man you paid 40,000 RMB to. 
Is he a sole agent or does he belong to a company? 
Sun Yang: Hmm, I’m really not sure. If I have problems in the shop, I 
call him.  
Interviewer: But does he have an office in China too? 
Sun Yang: Don’t think so… he just recommends a job to me here in 
Singapore.  
Interviewer: So you’re not too sure if this is a person or a company 
that is making these arrangements for you? 
Sun Yang: Really not sure, but it sounds like a company.  
Interviewer: Have you met this person/agent before? 
Sun Yang: Yes, only a few times.  
Interviewer: Do you have his name card? 
Sun Yang: No I don’t.  
In this case, the worker lacks the contact information of the middleman and 
has no means of verifying if the company is still in existence. Unfortunately, this is 
very typical of the respondents who work for small enterprises in Singapore. In some 
cases, respondent encounter bogus middlemen/agencies and have since been unable 




recruitment and MNC-initiated ones; the latter are often more formal and transparent 
and thus less problematic. In exposing these inconsistencies between middlemen 
agencies, I show that despite its growing importance, the migration industry does not 
contain a regulated middlemen system. This leaves room to explore informal 
relations in this business. Overall, recruitment processes although increasingly 
institutionalised, still contain many informal and non-standardised aspects.  
 
6.4.2 The Role of the State 
Another way in which recruitment is being institutionalised is by the state. 
The Singapore state is actively involved in the recruitment of potential immigrants, 
and this is yet another instance of the institutionalisation of immigration. I refer to a 
case study from the education ministry.  Due to the lack of local applicants for 
Chinese teaching positions, the Ministry of Education (MOE) recruits some teachers 
from abroad. A direct approach is to conduct recruitment fairs in major cities in 
China.  
“I do know of some colleagues from Northern China. I think this is 
because MOE heads to the big cities like Beijing to find these people. 
Also, they may be more headhunting firms there.”  
(Li Mei, Educator) 
In addition, interested individuals may submit an application online via the MOE 
website.  The availability of these formal channels demonstrates the presence of 
structured methods of recruitment, which stands in contrast to Massey’s idea of 




 There is also a more indirect approach. MOE, with the support of private 
enterprises, recruits students through various scholarships. A focus group I 
conducted revealed this. All three respondents came to Singapore on a scholarship 
and are working in the education industry now: 
Interviewer: I wish to know a little about how you came to 
Singapore… how did you get that scholarship – MOE8 went over to 
your schools? 
Zheng Hao: Yeah… 
Interviewer: So did a lot of people get this scholarship? 
Wei Yang: I think in each province, 10 to at most, 40, from the top 
high schools. And we also have to go through the examinations and 
interviews conducted by MOE. 
Interviewer: So MOE brought people over? 
Zheng Hao: MOE and NTU
9
 and NUS
10… some of the professors also 
joined the interviews. So during the interview, we had one from MOE, 
one from NUS and one from NTU.  
Interviewer: All of you went through the same? 
Zhou Wen: Exactly the same.  
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Zheng Hao: It’s standard. Every year there are hundreds of students 
coming to Singapore. 
For some years now, the Singapore state has been internationalising higher 
education, by way of globalising educational institutions (Ng and Tan 2010) and 
framing Singapore as an education hub (Sidhu, Ho and Yeoh 2011). This 
marketization of education is further institutionalised by way of standardisation. For 
interested applicants, there are standardised tests:   
“We also had a written exam. Math, Physics and Chinese… Oh yeah! 
Like an IQ test too. It was fun.” (Zhou Wen, Educator) 
According to another interviewee, government-linked corporations such as 
“Sembcorp, DBS, Singapore Airlines, Keppel” were present at these fairs. The 
students suggested that MOE played the role of the “middle person” or a 
“coordinator” between students and companies.  
“Our scholarships consist of two parts. One is offered by MOE under 
the standard tuition grant. The other is offered by other companies.” 
Students on this scheme typically have a bond to serve upon the completion of their 
studies. They are required to find employment in Singapore for at least three years. 
The involvement of “big companies” or government-linked companies (Yeung 2004) 
demonstrates the intersection between private industries and state activities. In this 
case, the state plays the role of a “coordinator” between private enterprises and 
potential students. On a larger scale, the involvement of both the private and public 




bases of recruitment networks are more varied today as they can involve large 
organisations and the state.  
This involvement of institutions is a contrast to recruitment patterns of the 
past which rarely involved the state, and relied mostly on close and personal ties. 
Furthermore, in the past, migration opportunities were never publicised whereas 
immigration conventions occur regularly today. In fact, as the focus group discussion 
shows, specific immigration fairs do occur between China and Singapore today – 
MOE and corporations regularly head to China to recruit students. However, I 
qualify that the details of this state-sponsored education are lacking, perhaps due to it 
being a very recent phenomenon. This large-scale PRC student migration to 
Singapore therefore remains a topic to be explored in migration studies. 
 
Industry Scanning and Destination Promotion  
Non-profit agencies are equally essential in the conceptualisation of the 
‘migration industry’.  Specifically, I emphasize the role of the state. While states are 
not profit-oriented enterprises, they do fuel the migration industry by creating an 
environment that is favourable for the industry to flourish. This state-industry nexus 
is particularly salient in light of the Singapore state’s influence over migration 
policies and frameworks (Massey 1999). By pursuing this argument, I am suggesting 
that although migration services have largely been privatised, they are still very 
much within the purview of the state. This is similar to the instances of migration 
industries in East Asia; Surak (2011) contends that the state supports the 
advancement of migration industries. This role of the state thus surfaces a paradox in 




suggests that migration is being commericalised and the state has shifted immigration 
responsibilities to the private sector. Yet on the other hand, it is the state’s 
withdrawal from direct roles which creates the optimal conditions for migration 
industries to grow. This paradox foregrounds the persisting role of state in 
immigration. On other occasions, the state pursues explicit immigration agendas, and 
the migration industry latches onto it. In Tseng’s (1997) account of the immigration 
industry in Taiwan, she notes that the country’s drive for more business migration 
programmes, usually spearheaded by the government, reinforces the role of private 
agencies. With increasingly specialisation in the immigration markets, private 
agencies look set to grow. The state is therefore simultaneously involved and 
uninvolved. Overall, these scenarios support the argument within globalisation 
studies that increasing mobility does not result in a declining role of the state. On the 
contrary, it emphasizes the persisting, if not increasing, role of the state (Teitelbaum 
2002).  
In Singapore, government institutions are progressively more involved in 
immigration issues. While these institutions are not profiting economically from the 
placement of immigrants, I argue that they are instrumental in advancing the 
migration industry through immigrant selection, marketing and promotion, 
operations and by surveying industry needs. These institutions shape the climate for 
other institutions to carry out their activities pertaining to immigrants. The National 
Population Talent Division 
11
(NPTD) for example, is a fairly new establishment 
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 The National Population Talent Division (NPTD) strives to achieve a sustainable and cohesive 
population that supports a vibrant economy, with a strong Singaporean core. To do this, NPTD drives 
the coordination and implementation of population policies across Government agencies. NPTD’s 




which deals with new immigrant issues such as integration, talent and naturalisation 
and Engagement and Outreach. Another key institution is Contact Singapore 
12
(CS). 
Formed in alliance with the Ministry of Manpower (MOM) and the Economic 
Development Board (EDB), the CS website states that it “actively links Singapore-
based employers with professionals to support the growth of (our) key industries”. 
More specifically, government agencies play a facilitative role in the development of 
the migration industry. Skilled foreigners and skilled overseas Singaporeans from 
particular industries are targeted by the state to come to Singapore to work in order to 
meet industry demands. A marketing representative at CS explained that they 
approach various institutions for potential immigrants, and these immigrants fill 
specific ‘industry needs’: 
“Because they have their own profiles… For example, Peking Uni 
Medical Faculty alumni. It’s very specific so it makes sense for us to 
work with them because we are specifically looking for doctors. But 
we don’t go down to the level of individuals, which headhunters do.”  
CS organises programmes overseas with the objective of spreading information on 
the possibilities and prospects of working in Singapore. However, as a state-linked 
organisation, it does not recruit nor does it deal with immigration applications. It 
merely provides information to overseas communities.  
                                                                                                                                          
(b) Engaging and rooting talent; (c) Naturalising and integrating our new immigrants; and (d) 
Engaging overseas Singaporeans. (Source: https://www.nptd.gov.sg/content/NPTD/about_nps.html)  
12
 Contact Singapore is an alliance of the Singapore Economic Development Board and Ministry of 
Manpower. We engage overseas Singaporeans and global talent to work, invest and live in Singapore. 
Contact Singapore actively links Singapore-based employers with professionals to support the growth 
of our key industries.  We work with investors to realise their business and investment interests in 




“Yes, they can contact us if they wish to, usually for details or for 
specific job descriptions. They can always go to the job portals. We 
actually work with industries and avail for them a free platform to put 
in job scopes that they need.” 
It does so through channels such as schools, industry associations, universities and 
alumni groups: 
“Alumni… For example, you know that the top institutes are your IITs 
and IIMs
13
. These institutions have alumni institutions in Singapore. 
They actually help... if I am not wrong, they will work with alumni 
back home and tell them about job opportunities in Singapore. So they 
are like mini-CS as well.  
(Ms Goh, Contact Singapore) 
As such, the state taps on existing education and industry institutions to reach its 
target audience, who are usually professionals from specific industries which are not 
adequately staffed in Singapore. As I have argued, recruitment channels today, 
consist of institutionalised avenues such as schools, industry associations and alumni 
associations. In contrast, the case of old Chinese migration shows that the British 
adopted a laissez-faire policy during the colonial era, leaving the Chinese 
businessmen to recruit fellow Chinese workers from various districts in China.  
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Fulfilling Industry Needs 
 Furthermore, the objective of CS is also institutionally-oriented; it works with 
organisations to fill the needs of larger industries. It also explicitly aims to fulfil the 
needs of local industries, by identifying key industries which require skills which the 
local population lacks. Specifically, it tries to locate niche skill-sets and identify 
budding industries, before looking at various sources for potential immigrants. 
“(We) fulfil industry needs. In a nutshell, that’s all we do. Because 
employers would need certain skill sets that they have tried but are 
unable to find within Singapore. Hence the need to look out of 
Singapore…. Some industries don’t sound new but the kind of skill 
sets they are looking for are apparently also facing shortages across 
the world. Things like Integrated Chip Design which is used in 
electronics… Electronics is not a new industry but this is a skill set 
which is required quite widely. Like I said, Interactive and Digital 
Media (IDM). We are in need of healthcare folks as well – doctors 
and allied health professionals which means the nurses, 
physiotherapists, speech therapists. And then there are also those 
niche industries, the budding industries like cleantech, commodity 
trading, data analysis, computing. These are all very niche and 
specific. 
(Ms Goh, Contact Singapore) 
Anticipating the needs of emerging industries gives CS a strategic role in shaping the 
incoming migrant population. Following which, they put in place structures and 




contains a plethora of information concerning living and working in Singapore 
(Figure 22).  
 
Figure 22: CS Website catering to potential immigrants – students, young professionals, experienced 
professionals and investors 
The information ranges from locating job opportunities to moving checklists and 
relocation help. This one-stop portal for potential immigrants simplifies the 
immigrant process for interested parties. It is only the state I argue, which has the 
resources and institutional connections to combine in one platform all related 
resources. This role while non-profit in nature, is fundamental to subsequent profit-
driven initiatives such as headhunting, relocation and opportunities for private 





In addition, I argue that this facilitative role allows the state to match the 
supply of immigrants to the demand of various institutions. ‘Institutional matching’ 
as I term it, is the basis of the work of CS and related government institutions. Ms 
Goh elaborates:  
“Basically... if you see the make-up of CS, we have two parent 
organisations: MOM and EDB. So that already tells you very clearly 
what’s our mandate… we actually look for skilled talent outside of 
Singapore for employers who can’t meet or can’t fulfil the vacancies 
of those specific skill sets within Singapore. Like they can’t find those 
skill sets within Singapore.”  
However, CS is deeply involved in facilitating rather than actively pursuing 
immigration:  
“Actually, we don’t really help them (new immigrants) find a place in 
Singapore… maybe the way to understand CS is that we are just a 
facilitator. At the end of the day, whether a foreign talent is hired or 
not is not our call… We just match.” 
Much like bureaucracies, they adopt rationalised and impersonal processes. Again, 
this relates to the concept of institutional networks (chapter five) as links which are 
impersonal and even, temporary. When asked if they keep in touch with potential 




Ms Goh: Well if they tell us that they actually found a job in 
Singapore through our programmes then yeah we would know. But a 
lot of times, we don’t know. 
Interviewer: So what happens after the guy is hired? Does he still 
maintain ties with this organisation? 
Ms Goh: Not really… We are just one channel, not the only one… 
And at this point, with the internet creating a borderless world in that 
sense, there is no one single channel. Like you said, there are the 
private recruiters. They are also companies because they can just 
transfer people. 
As I proposed in chapter five, the usage of institutional networks is increasingly 
more common. They are also weak ties and broad-based which allow individuals 
who have these networks to freely construct other networks with a range of other 
institutions. In contrast, trust/personal networks permit a limited scope of interactions 
(Tilly 1007: 5-6). True to this, an immigrant’s institutional ties to CS constitute only 
one of many channels through which immigrants tap on.  
 
Marketing and Promotion  
As an arm of the state, CS has the resources to forecast various needs, and the 
infrastructure to market existing opportunities across the globe. These objectives are 
executed through various marketing and promotional campaigns. The marketization 




and personal ties to formal business relations. CS does this in two ways. First, it 
actively organises events and networks with potential skilled immigrants:  
“We market events sometimes. Because at CS, we hold events like 
Careers Singapore, specific to industries and the different markets. 
For marketing and communications, we do publicity for these events.  
(Ms Goh, Contact Singapore) 
Through these events, CS is able to gather a database of potential immigrants to 
Singapore:  
“We do have a database of potential candidates but I think the key 
difference between us and private companies is that we usually do 
more broad-based engagements. Recruitment companies are very 
one-to-one… Broad-based meaning we hold events, we invite people 
who potentially possess that skill set to come and join and meet us at 
that event.” 
(Ms Goh, Contact Singapore) 
As part of the state, CS has the resources and the mandate to engage in broad-based 
promotion of immigration unlike private companies which have specific targets to 
meet on a monthly basis. 
 Second, marketization of immigration occurs through a strategic structural 
decision: CS has a global presence. As an organisation, CS has area offices in major 




marketing campaigns reach a wide spectrum of professionals. According to Ms Goh, 
CS has area offices in several regions, which serve to engage potential immigrants:  
“So basically, who we call Area Directors (the people based in our 
offices overseas)… they will work with industry associations and 
schools to look for those specific skill sets we need to meet…” 
Despite having a far-reaching presence, CS does not actually recruit people. It 
merely acts as an ‘immigration trigger’ – it forges an international presence, with the 
hope of encouraging talent to look for opportunities in key industries in Singapore. 
Operationally, the work of CS is planned along institutional lines. The area 
offices work to establish links with local institutions, mostly education and industry 
ones. Local institutions serve as the point of contact between Singapore and a 
potential pool of specific skills. This multi-level institutional networking aims to 
create communication channels between Singapore and overseas groups. 
“Our Area Directors will work with markets and approach schools 
and offer to contact what you call ‘Work in Singapore’ information 
sessions to their graduating students. Typically, they would be those 
who are Masters or post-Docs. Then, we also conduct these types of 
‘Work in Singapore’ information sessions with industry associations. 
Say for example, there is an industry association in China that keeps a 
database or has a member base of interactive and digital media artist. 
So we will actually check with them if they are happy to have us speak 
at one of their events just to provide perspectives on the possibility of 




(Ms Goh, Contact Singapore) 
The distinctive feature of CS’ work is its industry-oriented approach. Its marketing 
strategies often emphasize the presence of prominent MNCs in Singapore: 
“If I am talking about interactive and digital media talent, what sells 
would be the big brands that have set up offices in Singapore, like 
Lucas, Double Negative, Ubisoft. So rather than only going to the US 
or the UK, there is a place outside of these countries which is 
Singapore that these offices are located.” 
(Ms Goh, Contact Singapore) 
It is this industry agenda that drives new immigration. Along with marketing the 
work opportunities and lifestyle in Singapore, CS promotes Singapore’s industry 
potential. Ms Goh elaborates:  
“What CS will try to bring across is the fact that we have many 
different budding industries and established industries here. So at the 
core of what we do is really to fulfil industry needs… Because we 
basically have to make sure that our employers and the companies 
which set up businesses in Singapore actually can run their 
businesses with the manpower needs that they have.” 
Therefore, the ultimate objectives of these marketing initiatives are state-driven; they 
are to support the work of MOM and EDB or the state’s agenda pertaining to 
manpower and economic development. Since the state essentially designs the scope 




industry although it is not explicitly profit-oriented and does not directly contribute 
to the revenue generated from immigration services.  
 
6.4.3 International Mobility Industry   
These state-led initiatives encourage the growth of existing immigration-
related businesses. One business that executes the recruitment services is called the 
international mobility industry, which focuses on providing logistical and 
administrative services, usually to expatriates. Kieran, who works as a mobility 
consultant describes his job: 
 “My work is actually expat assignment consultant, so it’s not really 
recruitment… So we have a pool of clients (companies/MNCs) 
already and they bring their employees, say for example, from the US 
to Singapore… I deal with things from immigration to tax to house-
hunting, shipment and everything. My company works with existing 
employees who are recruited in their home country and they bring 
them to Singapore, for example. So they are existing employees of the 
client company.” 
The mobility industry is highly institutionalised, and involves several organisations; 
specifically, immigrants are represented by organisations which interact with other 
organisations throughout the entire relocation process. Personal networks are less 




Overtime, the mobility industry develops and becomes more differentiated. 
Niche areas, in the form of highly specific roles, are thus established. Destination 
service consultants are such examples:  
“We also work with some field consultants who do settling in 
orientations, like a tour guide… Destination service consultants 
provide consulting on what the area is like, what’s there to do in 
Singapore, what does Singapore look like, where the nearest grocery 
is, where the nearest hospital is. And also, they help with getting 
maids for example. 
(Kieran, Mobility Consultant) 
The job of the mobility consultant is to help expatriates settle in a new country, but 
this often does not entail direct interaction with the expatriate. The relationship 
between the consultant and his expatriate client is impersonal. A typical process 
involves mainly organisations dealing with other organisations. This resonates with 
my earlier argument that institutional networks are usually impersonal, unlike 
trust/personal networks (Tilly 2007: 5-6) which were more commonly used in the 
past. Kirean describes the lack interaction with clients:  
“I don’t work with the immigrants. The expatriate’s company works 
with my company and my company doesn’t interact with the 
immigrant at all… I am the project manager.” 
(Kieran, Mobility Consultant) 
Tax officers, shippers and destination services consultants are specific roles related 




engaged whenever an organisation has a relocation assignment. He does not liaise 
directly with the expatriate but only with his client organisations and other service 
providers. The differentiation of roles and professions within the industry is 
indicative of the maturity of this sector. Given the frequency of cross-border 
movement today, it is likely that the services of this industry will continue to be in 
demand.  
 
6.5 The Growing Migration Industry 
Finlay and Coverdill (1999) suggest that the emergence of this industry points 
to an important shift in hiring processes: while hiring is traditionally done within the 
firm, it is today, a function that is often performed externally. This outsourcing of 
hiring, I suggest, is made possible due to the large pool of potential workers created 
by conditions of globalisation; as mobility becomes increasingly prevalent, the 
possibility of drawing labour from various parts of the world is made more feasible. 
One headhunter shares how he recruits and tells me that China is a growing supplier 
of immigrant labour: 
“We have presence in 34 countries. Our database is a network of all 
the countries. Based on that, the bulk of the money we are making is 
from China… We are probably one of the biggest recruitment 
consultancies in China; we entered the market 14 years ago. In other 
parts of Asia, we have boutique offices. So basically, the portal is 
being used by the China audience... what I do understand is that, for 
every single accountant... probably out of 20 candidates, I would dare 




China applying or they could be Singaporean-based Chinese (has 
worked here for the last 3-4 years). Surprisingly they are huge in 
quantity… their competency in English is usually lower but… they are 
extremely good technically, and some companies understand that 
since they are accountants, they don’t have to be very good in 
English… If they are accountants coming from China, 75% I would 
dare say, are ladies. This would mean that my candidates come from 
a background where they don’t have to do national service. For me to 
get a person of 3 years of experience, that’s easy for me. They are 
everywhere. But for fresh graduates, even more! We are looking at 3-
4 years of experience.... that’s the one we’re looking for, the bulk.”  
(Fazial, Headhunter) 
Employees from China are certainly capable and well-suited for many jobs. The 
sheer number of interested individuals from China makes it a growing market for 
headhunting businesses. Singapore, as a destination popular amongst Chinese 
immigrants, stands to gain from this large supply of labour. For the reasons of state-
led initiatives in Singapore coupled with China’s increasingly mobile and educated 
population, I contend that the China-Singapore migration industry has to potential to 
grow further.  
 In this chapter, I have referred to the political and economic relations between 
China and Singapore, which provide a strong foundation for China-Singapore 
migration. I have argued that this allows for the flourishing of a migration industry. 
Empirically, I demonstrate this through an examination of the following issues: 




social support organisations and the continual existence of logistics and mobility 
companies. I conclude that current usage of this term remains one-sided as it tends to 
focus on the illegal, profit-oriented, formal and new aspects of immigration 
businesses. As such, I propose four considerations to this concept. With these 






This thesis examines Chinese migration to Singapore by using the concept of 
migration industry. In chapters one and two, I started with the critique that the 
literature treats the accounts of migrant daily lives and institutional changes 
separately. As a consequence, how ground-level realities impact on the larger 
institutional context is overlooked. In this thesis, I integrate the perspectives of 
networks and institutions to show how changes in migration network dynamics affect 
the migration industry. The significance of integrating these two perspectives are a) 
to distinguish between old and new migration, b) to show the transition from old to 
new migration networks and c) to suggest that the migration industry has come to 
play an important role in contemporary Chinese migration to Singapore.  
 In chapters three and four I discuss migration in the colonial and global 
economy. In so doing, I differentiated between old and new migration. I also 
described the transition from the colonial economy in the 19
th
 century to the 21
st
 
century global economy. The colonial economy focused on resource extraction from 
various colonies. This economy was dominated by the tin mining and entrepôt 
sectors. Both these sectors depended heavily on Chinese coolies. However, 
circumstances changed from 1978 when China liberalised its economy. This period 
also saw the rise of the NICs in East Asia, which further strengthened the Asian 
economies. This encouraged the migration of professionals and blue-collar workers 
from various parts of China, a major departure from the colonial period when the 





Since the 1980s, the migration context became increasingly globalised. The global 
economy has widespread influence in generating unrestricted capital flows. 
Relatedly, while migration to specific regions in the past was dependent on personal 
ties, migration today relies on international institutions which place migrants in many 
countries and in many sectors of the economy. In contrast to the colonial economy, 
the global economy, is driven by markets irrespective of borders and is dominated by 
multinational corporations. With regards to labour migration, this era saw the rise of 
organised labour export and increasing trade with China. Unprecedented numbers of 
Chinese migrants are moving across the globe today. In chapter four, I identified the 
trends of the new immigration - transnationalism, diversification and 
professionalization. This new physical and socio-economic mobility and diversity 
have impacted on the current patterns of Chinese migration. Chinese migrants hold 
jobs which cut across many sectors and are more diffused in the economy and 
society. The organisation of migration has shifted away from one which was 
dependent on ethnic and regional ties. In place of personal networks are networks 
which are rooted in institutions, hence the significance of institutional networks.  
 This global context has given rise to new migration networks. In chapter five, 
I elaborated on the transition from old to new migration networks. What I termed the 
‘new network dynamics’ of migration refers to the rise of institutional networks, 
concomitant with the decline of personal networks. In putting forth this argument, I 
suggest that the networks of the past have changed. Specifically, networks are now 
more easily formed across space and hence, they are more diffused. Networks 
proliferate, but due to its wide-ranging scope, many of these are ‘weak’ institutional 




high network density whereas urban contemporary societies which are more 
individually-oriented, usually have a low network density.  
However, this does not mean that contemporary societies no longer rely on 
personal networks. Rather, I argue that personal networks take on new forms and 
exist as virtual and/or transnational networks. Broadly, I categorise these new forms 
of networks as institutional networks. Some examples include recruitment 
organisations, migrant NGOs and alumni institutions. The findings in this study show 
that respondents are more reliant on these institutions than on personal relations. In 
addition, respondents are using fewer familial networks, and also have weak ties with 
fellow new Chinese immigrants. Unsurprisingly then, their social lives are less 
dependent on traditional Chinese institutions such as clans and temples. These 
findings point towards more institutionalised and less personalised bases of 
migration networks.  
 Overall, these institutionalised migration networks come together to 
constitute the migration industry. In chapter six, I argue that the migration industry is 
now critical to contemporary Chinese migration. I suggest that the context of 
globalisation has given rise to the exponential growth of migration today, 
contributing to the growth of the migration industry. I refer primarily to the China-
Singapore migration industry for several reasons. China and Singapore have unique 
economic and historical ties which have allowed the migration-industry to flourish. 
This industry consists of actors in both the private and public sectors, which provide 
migration-related services. These include recruitment and headhunting, sponsorship 
and logistics services. As China continues to liberalise and more people are 




activity. This thesis proposes an emerging organisation of Chinese migration 
constituted by changing networks and institutions. 
My examination of the changing social organisation of Chinese migration 
also highlights areas which warrant more attention. While the literature describes 
many instance of new immigration, it overlooks the historical and comparative 
significance of Chinese migration. This historical and comparative perspective 
remains less developed in migration studies. Second, there may be other institutions 
involved in the migration process which this study has overlooked. With the growing 
prevalence of immigration, it is likely that more institutions - both profit and non-
profit- will emerge. Migration-related institutions remain an under-researched area. 
Third, the institutionalisation of migration looks set to grow. In a global environment 
where states are constantly in competition with each other for the best talent, there 
are compelling reasons to believe that institutionalised migration continues to be the 
trend. State-sponsored education for example, is a recent phenomenon. There may 
also be sports-related migration which facilitates the movement of top athletes 
around various countries. Finally, the migration industry is set to grow as the Asian 
economies grow from strength to strength. There are few case studies of the 
influence of the migration industry on immigration. The concept of migration 
industry is limited to its descriptive value. This thesis is a step towards utilizing it as 
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Appendix A: Interview points for Chinese Professionals  
 
General Questions about yourself 
1. Age/age range:  
2. Which industry do you work in: 
3. What is your highest qualification (eg. Bachelors, masters, PHD):  
4. Place of birth: 
5. Were you working in other cities before you came to Singapore? If so, name 
the cities: 
6. In which year did you come to Singapore?  
7. How long do you intend to stay in Singapore? 
8. Are you (underline one): 
a. a permanent resident 
b. a new citizen 
c. holding on to some kind of employment pass 
Coming to Singapore 
1. Why did you decide to come to Singapore (write a few points/sentences if 
possible)? 
2. How did you find a job in Singapore? (underline one) 
a. I was posted to Singapore by my company 
b. I approach by a recruitment company in my home town 
c. Government agencies in Singapore gave me the job here 
d. Others: ________ 
3. If you were sent by your company, did they offer you relocation services such 
as housing and allowance for settling in:  
a. Yes. If yes, what assistance did the company 
offer?____________________ 
b. No 
4. How long did it take you to relocate to Singapore?  
5. Do you intend to stay in Singapore? 






Adjustment to Life in Singapore  
1. What do you usually do during your free time? (write a few points/sentences 
if possible) 
2. Who do you usually hang out with during your free time? (write a few 
points/sentences if possible) 
3. How many PRC friends do you have in Singapore? (write a few 
points/sentences if possible) 
4. Generally, where did you meet most of your PRC friends (eg. Office, housing 
estate)? (write a few points/sentences if possible) 
5. How many Singaporean friends do you have?  
6. What do you usually do during your free time?  
7. Generally, where did you meet most of your Singaporean friends (eg. Office, 
housing estate)? 
Organisations and Association 
1. Do you belong in any clubs or societies (eg, Chinese immigrant associations 
or country clubs)?  
a. If no why did you not join? If yes, why did you join? (write a few 
points/sentences if possible) 
2. Do you find that as a working professional, you have very few opportunities 
to mingle with PRCs and Singaporeans outside of work?  
a. If so, what suggestions do you have to improve this situation? 
3. When you encounter problems with your employment pass or 




Appendix B: Interview points for Recruitment Companies/Personnel 
 
About the International Mobility Industry  
1. How long has it been in existence? 
2. Who are h trends in the industry these days? 
Recruitment of Talent  
1. How is this done? For example, does your organisation conduct emigration 
fairs abroad? 
2. How is Singapore marketed to potential new immigrants? 
3. Am I right to say that recruitment strategies are different in different 
companies since it is after all, a matter of competition? 
4. In Singapore at this point in time, what are the challenges of recruiting 
foreign talent? 
5. Apart from recruitment, what other services does your organisation provide to 
foreign talent? 
 
Maintaining Ties with Clients 
1. After clients have been recruited or placed, does your company still maintain 
contact with them? 
2. In your opinion, have you seen many cases in which immigrants rely on their 
own networks (rather than recruitment companies) to secure a job overseas? 






Appendix C: Interview points for Government Organisations (i) 
 
About Contact Singapore/ Emerging migration industry in Singapore 
1. When did Contact Singapore begin its operations? 
a. What are its functions apart from seeking out talented individuals who 
would like to move to Singapore? 
b. What kinds of professionals are you targeting? Does it go by industry, 
age-range, nationality? 
c. How is it different from private recruitment companies? 
2. “Contact Singapore actively links Singapore-based employers with global 
talent and provides updates on career opportunities and industry 
developments in Singapore.” – How is this conducted in operational terms? 
3. We work with public and private sector partners to facilitate the interests of 
potential individual investors in Singapore. – Contact Singapore does the 
‘scouting’ work for private companies as well?  
4. Contact Singapore brings professionals into Singapore. What happens after – 
do these people maintains ties with this organisation? 
5. If not for the work of Contact Singapore and other related organisations, how 
difficult would it be for immigrants to find their ways here? In the past, how 
did skilled migration to Singapore occur?  
Marketing Singapore to the World 
1. Target groups? Are these people here for long-term purposes? (new 
immigrants, permanent residency)  
2. “It aims to attract global talent to work, invest and live in Singapore” - What 
the biggest draw to Singapore and also the most unattractive trait? 





Appendix C: Interview points for Government Organisations (ii) 
 
About NPTD 
1. When did NPTD begin its operations 
2. From the website, it appears that NPTD organises a lot of events for new 
immigrants and overseas Singaporeans.  
3. After these events, how does NPTD maintain ties with these people? 
4. Apart from events, how else does NPTD assist new immigrants? 
Recruitment of Talent/Talent Migration  
1. One arm of your organisation deals with ‘Talent Engagement and Outreach’. 
How is this done? For example, does your organisation conduct emigration fairs 
abroad? 
Integration 
1. What are the existing social integration plans? Relatedly, what kinds of events 
does your organisation organise in this area?  
2. Are all new immigrants made to go through certain integration programmes? If 
not, how are new immigrants made aware of such adaptation programmes? 
3. How are integration programmes organised? In generic ways or through specific 
sub-groups such as occupation or language or country of origin etc? 
4. What are the challenges in this regard? 
Network Dynamics (How connected are new immigrants?) 
1. Apart your organisation, NIC and maybe even Contact Singapore, which other 
government agencies such work with new immigrants? 
2. Are new immigrants generally aware of such governmental support?  
                                                 
 
 
